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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
J u r i s d i c t i o n i s c o n f e r r e d upon t h e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t 
pursuant to section 78~2a-3, Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
There are three basic issues presented to this court for 
review. Each issue has a number of sub-issues related and con-
tributing to the main issue involved. 
1. What is the appropriate standard for determining visitation 
when the custodial party relocates out of the State of Utah with 
the minor children of the parties. Should the court continue to 
use the actual extended visitation which occurred prior to the 
move, which was limited by the custodial parent, as a controlling 
basis or rationale for the visitation awarded after the move? 
How does one reconcile the differences between the recommendation 
of the Domestic Relation Commissioner, who has great expertise in 
this area, and the order of the court which was based upon the 
history of visitation prior to the relocation out-of-state. Is 
it in the best interests of the children who are caught up in 
interstate visitation to split the visitation based on age, 
which in this case requires that one child be sent home to the 
custodial parent while the other remains to exercise his full 
4 
visitation? 
2. The second issue involves all aspects of the interpretation 
and implementation of an order for reimbursement of work-related 
day care expenses under §78-45-7.16 and 78-45-7.17, Utah Code 
Annot. (1953, as amended). Does the statute contemplate requir-
ing payment of one-half of the day-care expenses without a re-
quirement of an itemization or accounting of the expenses claimed 
and without verification that the recipient was actually employed 
and not on vacation or engaged in some other activity? Does this 
statute contemplate the full cost of a day-care provider who 
provides laundry, cleaning, cooking and other household services 
in the custodial parent's home? Does it require reimbursement 
for both the day-care provider and concurrent private preschool 
or school, even though public school is available, where the 
children are in school, not with the day-care provider, for a 
good portion of the day? 
3. Should the court consider a second employment in setting the 
amounts to be paid, without any historic basis for that second 
income? 
4. May findings contain matters which were not found by the 
court pursuant to a review of the transcript and entered over the 
objection of the other party. The standard of review for this 
issue is that of "clearly erroneous". Maughn v. Maughn 770 P. 2d 
156 (Utah App. 1989). 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
AND RULES 
The following are the citations for the provisions which 
Defendant believes may be determinative of the issues presented. 
Each provision, statute or rule is set forth in its entirety in 
section "C" of the attached addendum. 
A. Statutes: Sections 30-3-5; 78-45-7.5; 78-45-7.16; 
78-45-7.17; and, 78-45-7.18, Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended). 
B. Rules: Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
C. Defendant is not aware at this time of any constitu-
tional provisions, ordinances or Utah cases which are dispositive 
on the issues raised herein. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case: 
Defendant filed a petition for modification of a decree of 
divorce seeking a change of visitation due to Plaintiff's move to 
California with the children of the parties. Plaintiff counter-
petitioned seeking modification of the amount of day care reim-
bursement Defendant was required to pay to Plaintiff. 
B. Course of proceedings: 
The petition and counterpetitions for modification of the 
decree of divorce filed in this matter came on for trial on April 
6 
2, 1992, after having been before a domestic relations commis-
sioner for a pretrial and after a pretrial before the trial 
judge. 
C. Disposition at trial court: 
An order modifying the decree of divorce was entered June 
30, 1992, in the Third Judicial District Court. No motions were 
made under Rules 50(a) and (b), 52(b), 54(b), or 59, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. The notice of appeal was filed on July 23, 
1992. Record at 239. A copy of the order entered is set forth 
in Addendum MA" attached hereto. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
A decree of divorce was entered by the trial court on Au-
gust, 22, 1990. Record at 118-129. Plaintiff was awarded custo-
dy of the two minor children of the parties subject to 
Defendant's visitation. Record at 119-121. 
Defendant was awarded the following as his extended visita-
tion: i.) Christmas Day from 6:00 PM through December 26th at 
8:00 PM; ii.) Prior to the children entering school, two one-week 
blocks in the summer and once the children reach the age of nine, 
six weeks in the summer, not to exceed four weeks for one visita-
tion block; iii.) Upon the children entering school one-half of 
the Christmas break and one month in the summer for two two-week 
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periods. Record at 119 - 121. In addition to the extended 
visitation, Defendant was granted reasonable visitation defined 
as: Alternate weekends from Friday at 6:00 PM to Sunday at 6:00 
PM; Alternate holidays; One evening on the off week from 5:30 PM 
to 8:30 PM; Father's day; and, the afternoon and evening of each 
child's birthday or one day in the week of that birthday. Id. 
Defendant fully exercised his rights of visitation. Tran-
script, at 50. He had the children with him as often as he 
could, and Plaintiff had him care for the children at additional 
times. Transcript, at 51, and 57. 
At the end of August, 1991, Plaintiff moved to California 
with the minor children and her new husband. Transcript, at 27 
and Record at 145. Her sole reason for the move was to allow her 
husband to attend school. Transcript, at 28. Record at 157-158. 
Prior to this relocation, Plaintiff gave to Defendant notice 
of her intentions to move to California. Discussions to settle 
changes to the visitation failed. Record at 149. On August 15, 
1991, Defendant filed his petition for modification of the 
decree of divorce on the issue of visitation. Record at 131-136. 
Plaintiff was served with process on August 15, 1991. Record at 
157-158. 
Plaintiff counterclaimed on the issue of the amount of day-
care to be reimbursed to her from Defendant. Record at 142-151. 
Plaintiff alleged that day-care under the statute should include 
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paying for private preschool and paying for a full-time day care 
provider who would be present in the home while the minor chil-
dren were in school. Record at 193-195, 208-209. Transcript at 
38. 
The claims came on for a pretrial settlement hearing on 
October 28, 1991, before Commissioner Arnett. Record at 174-175. 
He recommended the Defendant be granted one-half of the school 
summer vacation. Id. These recommendations were accepted by De-
fendant, but rejected by Plaintiff. Transcript, at 3 and 24. 
The case went to trial on April 2, 1992. Record at 207. 
The court received and utilized information of Defendant's second 
employment, a fledgling solo legal practice, without historical 
review of Defendant's actual income, determined based thereon 
that Defendant was capable of paying more, and based the award of 
day-care thereon. Transcript, at 13 and 78. The court found it 
reasonable that Defendant reimburse total day-care expenses which 
included housekeeping services in Plaintiff's home, i.e., includ-
ing doing the children's laundry, cleaning the children's rooms, 
preparing the children's meals and cleaning up after them, stay-
ing in the home while the children were in school and being on 
call; and that the day-care reimbursement should be at a flat 
rate without any proof as to utilization of the day care in a 
work-related manner. Transcript, at 7 7 - 7 9 . Further, the court 
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found that Plaintiff may continue the five year old child in 
private preschool or private school, with one-half of the expense 
of both school and a full-time day care provider being charged to 
Defendant as work related day-care while the day-care provider 
remains alone at the Plaintiff's home during school hours. 
Transcript at 8 0 - 8 2 . The costs of private school were to be 
charged to Defendant on an order to show cause without a full 
hearing on any allegations raised by Plaintiff in support of her 
position. Transcript, at 81 - 82. The result of this is the 
shifting of the burden of proof onto the Defendant to rebut the 
schooling. The judge indicated that it was her personal opinion 
that it is reasonable to split the children up for visitation 
purposes during the two years while the transition from age seven 
to age nine occurs for the younger child, despite both parties 
indicating that the children should be treated equally. Tran-
script, at 52 and 73. 
The findings presented by Plaintiff and signed by the court 
contained a number of additional matters which were not found by 
the court as a review of the transcript shows. Record at 211 -
213. These findings and the order based there on were entered 
over the objection of Defendant. Record at 216 -217. This 
appeal was filed on those findings and order. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court, in limiting extended visitation, abused 
its discretion in light of the standardized visitation schedule 
in effect and the nature of the changed circumstances. It is an 
abuse of discretion to require siblings to be split up for any 
portion of the extended visitation. 
In arriving at its findings, the trial court erred in hear-
ing or considering any actual extended visitation which occurred 
prior to the change in circumstance, as the parties had been 
divorce for only one year prior to the change and as Plaintiff, 
the custodial parent, controlled any other visitation than that 
which was ordered prior to the change. 
II. The trial court committed reversible error in its award of 
day care and in the findings supportive of that award. 
A. The provisions of 78-45-7.16 and -7.17, Utah Code 
Annot. (1953, as amended) should control any order of day care 
reimbursement. It was an abuse of the court's powers to set a 
flat fee without the requirement of documentation contemplated by 
those statutes particularly in light of the facts that the day 
care provider is performing service to Plaintiff other than day 
care and that the children are absent for significant periods of 
time during the day. 
B. "Reasonable day care" (emphasis added) requires that 
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the court consider all factors including the necessity of the 
expense of private school; it was error for the court to award 
the amount of day care which it did, It was further error to 
speculate regarding future secondary income in that award without 
a proven history of that secondary income, 
C. The Plaintiff should be required to substantiate the 
use of the day care provider for work-related purposes in order 
to obtain reimbursement from Defendant to alleviate abuses which 
have occurred in the past and to insure that the expenses truly 
are work-related. 
III. It is clearly erroneous for a trial court to sign and enter 
findings of fact which do not comport with the oral pronouncement 
of its finding as reflected by the transcript particularly when 
an objection is filed addressing those errors. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING LIMITED 
VISITATION, IN SPLITTING UP THE CHILDREN FOR VISITATION AND IN 
USING THE VISITATION WHICH ACTUALLY OCCURRED PRIOR TO THE CHANGE 
IN CIRCUMSTANCES AS THE BASIS FOR THE AWARD UNDER THE MODIFICA-
TION. 
The trial court retains jurisdiction over this matter and 
has the power to modify a decree of divorce upon a showing of a 
substantial change in circumstances. Walton v. Walton, 814 P. 2d 
619, 621 (Utah App. 1991). See also, Maughn v. Maughn, 770 P. 2d 
156, 159 (Utah App. 1989) and § 30-3-5, Utah Code Annot. (1953, 
as amended). This is true even though Plaintiff, during the 
proceedings below, relocated to California with the minor chil-
dren of the parties. Curtis v. Curtis, 789 P. 2d 717, 722-725 
(Utah App. 1990). 
Defendant has located no Utah cases directly on point on the 
issue of modification of visitation orders based upon relocation 
of the parties. Therefore Defendant is unable to cite the exact 
standard of review for this court. The above cited Utah cases 
involve custody issues and are concerned with the "ping-pong" 
effect that changes of custody can create. See, Maughn, 770 P. 
2d at 159-161. The standard applied there was the abuse of 
discretion or manifest injustice. Id. As the need to protect 
the children from the "ping-pong" effect and the attendant need 
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to protect the children is not present in this case, a lower 
standard of review of the trial court would be appropriate. 
There has been a material change of circumstances in this 
case. Plaintiff, who has custody of the minor children of the 
parties, moved to California with those children. This was done 
solely to allow Plaintiff's new husband to attend school, and not 
for any reason beneficial to Plaintiff or the minor children. 
The net effect is a substantial decrease in the amount of visita-
tion which Defendant could have with the children, thereby de-
priving him of meaningful contact with the children. 
Creech v. Creech, 367 So. 2d 1244 (La. App., 1979) deals 
directly with modifying a divorce decree on the issue of visita-
tion due to the noncustodial parent's relocation from Louisiana 
to Mexico. The virtual inability to exercise the decreed visita-
tion was recognized and the court found it appropriate to sub-
stantially change the visitation award. Creech 367 So. 2d at 
1246. 
In Creech, the father, the noncustodial parent, was origi-
nally granted visitation rights of one weekend per month, the 
last week in December and two weeks in the summer. Id. This 
comes out to about forty-five days of visitation a year. 
The trial court in that case found that "the best interest 
of the children would be served and fairness would prevail upon 
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the part of all parties if a summer visitation period was in-
creased from two weeks to five weeks ... .' By enabling meaning-
ful visitation with their father, this arrangement could be more 
beneficial to the children." Id. This finding was affirmed by 
the Louisiana court of appeals. Id. The net effect of this 
finding was that the father ended up with forty-two days of 
visitation a year. He only lost three days of visitation per 
year. 
In the instant case, Defendant was previously awarded rea-
sonable visitation which amounted to eighty-seven days per year. 
Under the order being appealed, Defendant has thirty-five days of 
visitation per year. Under that order, visitation will, in three 
years, increase to forty-nine days of visitation. This is a 
truly significant decrease. 
Plaintiff was questioned about concerns other than those 
arising from the reasons for the divorce. Transcript at 54, and 
57 - 58. She did not provide any other concerns. In fact she 
admitted at that point that the parties did not have blocks of 
time in which Defendant could visit with the children the summer 
before the move to California. Transcript at 57. She stated, 
that Defendant was limited to the time Plaintiff would allow 
before that move. Id. 
Defendant asserts that the doctrine of res judicata applies 
in this matter and that all of the alleged problems and concerns 
15 
raised by Plaintiff concerning conduct prior to the entry of the 
decree of divorce have been adjudicated. We do not have the 
concerns raised in Maughn concerning the basis of the initial 
determination. Maughn 770 P. 2d at 160. Therefore all of the 
Plaintiff's worries and concerns about the conduct of the Defend-
ant prior to the entry of divorce decree were improperly before 
the court. Those concerns did not prevent Plaintiff from stipu-
lating to the visitation described above at the time divorce case 
was entered. Yet within just days over a year after the decree 
of divorce was entered, Plaintiff moved to California and asserts 
that Defendant's visitation should be reduced for the same rea-
sons. Transcript at 58. 
In deciding the visitation issue, the court mentioned con-
cern about the ages of the children a number of times. Tran-
script at 7 1 - 7 1 . The children were five and seven at the time 
of the hearing. Transcript at 71. The standardized visitation 
schedule in effect at the time of the trial specified a four week 
block of time for visitation for in-state parties. (No stand-
ardized visitation schedule was in effect at the time of the 
original divorce.) The four week extended standardized visita-
tion begins upon the children entering school. The denial of 
more than two weeks at any time grants less time that the in-
state standardized visitation schedule. Further, the domestic 
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relations commissioner recommended that Plaintiff be granted one-
half of the school summer vacation. 
In re Marriage of Susan Hatzievgenakis and Vassilis Hatziev-
genakis, 434 NW 2d 914 (Iowa App, 1988), provides illumination on 
this issue. That case involved a divorce rather than modifica-
tion of a decree. The father was a citizen of Greece while the 
mother was a U. S. citizen. The child of the parties held a dual 
citizenship. In re Hatzievgenakis, 434 NW 2d at 915. The father 
maintain a Greek residence and was a Staff Captain on a Greek 
cruise ship. In re Hatzievgenakis, 434 NW 2d at 914 - 915. 
The mother raise numerous concerns about the father removing 
the child from the United States, about how various aspects of 
Greek society and culture may affect the child, and about the 
father failing to return the child. In re Hatzievgenakis, 434 NW 
2d at 916 - 917. The court of appeals allowed extended visita-
tion outside of the United State and the child was only six years 
of age at the time. In re Hatzievgenakis, 434 NW 2d at 915 and 
917. 
Greece is certainly much farther from Iowa than California 
is from Utah. Concerns about enforcement of the decree of di-
vorce do not exist, particularly as the Defendant in this matter 
is a resident of Utah. Hence if a child of six can travel abroad 
for extended visitation, children of six can travel one hour by 
air to Utah for extended visitation. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS AWARD OF DAY CARE AND IN ITS 
FINDINGS SUPPORTING THAT AWARD. 
A. THE PROVISIONS OF §78-45-7.16 AND -7.17, UTAH CODE 
ANNOT. (1989, AS AMENDED) CONTROL THE AWARD OF DAY CARE REIM-
BURSEMENT, IT WAS IMPROPER FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO SET A FLAT FEE 
WITHOUT THE REQUIREMENT OF DOCUMENTATION PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF 
THE FACT THAT THE DAY CARE PROVIDER IS PERFORMING ACTIVITIES 
OTHER THAN DAY CARE AND THAT THE CHILDREN ARE NOT WITH THAT DAY 
CARE PROVIDER FOR A SIGNIFICANT PERIOD OF TIME DURING THE DAY. 
The standard to be applied to this entire issue is in ques-
tion. No Utah cases have been located on the narrow issue of a 
modification of a day care award. Plaintiff suggests that 
§78-45-7.16 and -7.17, Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended), 
clearly controls and if a standard is required, the "clearly 
erroneous" standard of review should be utilized. 
These statutes concern "reasonable work-related day care 
costs actually incurred on behalf of the dependent children of 
the parents...". §78-45-7.16(1) Utah Code Annot. (1953, as 
amended). See also, §78-45-7.17 (1), Utah Code Annot. (1953, as 
amended). It is further stated that if the amount ceases to be 
incurred, payment may be suspended without modifying the prior 
order of the court. §78-45-7.16(2) Utah Code Annot. (1953, as 
18 
amended). 
Plaintiff asserted at trial that an in-home day care provid-
er was required for the entire day despite the fact that the 
minor children were in school for a good portion of the day while 
Plaintiff was at work. 
The statute states that the costs in question be actually 
incurred on behalf of the children. 78-45-7.16 (1) Utah Code 
Annot. (1953, as amended). The children are deriving no benefit 
from the day care provider if they are not with that person, as 
when they are in school. Hence it is violative of the statue to 
require Defendant to pay for one-half of the costs of a day care 
provider to simply sit in Plaintiff's home while the children are 
away from the home. 
Plaintiff alleged the need for a contact person for the 
school in the event of illness or problem with a child as justi-
fication for the day care provider sitting at home while the 
children are in school. Plaintiff is remarried and has asserted 
that her new husband be treated as an appropriate provider for 
the children. See, Plaintiff's counterclaim at 1NT2d, 3g. Record 
at 146 and 148 respectively. This means that Plaintiff has 
herself and her new husband as contact people with the children's 
school in the event of a problem. The possibility of having to 
leave employment due to a problem with a child at school is 
19 
simply part of being a parent whether divorced or not. 
Until the children are essentially emancipated there is 
always a potential need for someone to be "on call" should prob-
lems arise at school. At what age does this day care obligation 
terminate? 
Day care under Utah's statutes appears to consist of taking 
care of the children themselves. It should be reduced as the 
children enter school and eventually terminate as the children 
get older, and so the trial court found. Transcript at 78. 
Therefore to be ordered to pay for "on call" goes well beyond the 
scope of these statues and contrary to the court's own findings. 
Furthermore, while in California, and until just prior to trial, 
Plaintiff utilized a day care provider just after school, Tran-
script at 45. She did not historically have someone "on call". 
Plaintiff also admitted that the day care provider performed 
various household chores and that Plaintiff pays her no more for 
those duties. Transcript at 39-40. When the children are home, 
the day care provider, while performing these chores, is again 
unavailable to give the children her attention and attend to 
them. When the children are not at home, the day care provider 
is, in essence, a house keeper for Plaintiff or caring for anoth-
er child of Plaintiff's who is not part of this action. 
The court, in addition to allowing the "on call" nature of 
this matter also found that it was reasonable to require Defend-
20 
ant to pay for one-half of private preschool for one of the 
children and that the cost of the private preschool, $655 per 
month, was reasonable. Transcript at 75 and 78. Not only is 
Defendant required to pay one-half of the expenses for an "on 
call" person but also one-half of the private schooling for the 
one child, all purportedly as day care. This has the effect of 
requiring Defendant to pay twice for day care. 
B. THE DAY CARE EXPENSES MUST BE REASONABLE. IT WAS AN 
ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO AWARD AN AMOUNT IN EXCESS OF REASONABLE 
DAY CARE AND TO CONSIDER ANY SECONDARY INCOME IN THAT AWARD 
The statutes state reasonable day care costs. Defendant 
asserts that the costs incurred by Plaintiff are not reasonable. 
In addition to the above arguments, it must be remembered 
that Plaintiff did not move to California to advance her career, 
employment, or to benefit the minor children. She moved solely 
because her new husband desired to attend school there. Tran-
script at 28. 
In fact, Plaintiff testified that she actually did incur a 
slight decrease in her personal income as a result of this move, 
though her family income had increased. Plaintiff also knew that 
the cost of living would be higher as a result of her choice to 
please her new husband. Plaintiff's joint income at the time of 
21 
trial was substantial in comparison to Defendant's. Transcript 
at 12, 26, and 48, and Record at 169 - 175. This raised 
Plaintiff's standard of living to a level at which a housekeeper 
might be appropriate, but it is not appropriate to Defendant in 
his circumstances. 
While Plaintiff was married to Defendant, there was an in-
home day care provider for a period of that time. Plaintiff 
testified at trial that while in Utah the cost of this in-home 
day care provider averaged around $500 to $600 per month. At that 
time both of the children were preschool age. As a result of this 
voluntary move Plaintiff has almost doubled the cost of day care 
and seeks to have Defendant pay one-half of that doubling. 
Defendant's share of the cost of the Utah day care provider was 
reduced in the original decree because that provider was also 
performing household duties. 
The court required, and considered, evidence of a second 
income by Defendant despite objection. Transcript at 13 - 14. 
While there is no guideline in determining income for day care, 
§78-45-7.5 (2), Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended), does indi-
cate a limitation of income being equivalent to one full-time 
job. That action was error on the part of the trial court, 
particularly as there had been no history of that secondary 
i ncome. 
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C. PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO SUBSTANTIATE THE USE OF 
THE DAY CARE PROVIDER FOR WORK-RELATED PURPOSES IN ORDER TO 
OBTAIN REIMBURSEMENT. 
The flat nature of the order of the trial court opens the 
order to abuse in favor of the Plaintiff and to the detriment of 
the Defendant. The statutes contemplate an accounting through 
the use of the words "actually incurred" and the ability to 
terminate payments without the need for a modification if pay-
ments are not incurred. 
The flat payment as ordered allows Plaintiff to take vaca-
tions, trips, or even be unemployed or on sick or disability 
leave without notice to Defendant. See transcript at 28. Record 
at 253 - 254 and 256 - 257. Defendant would then make his con-
tribution and without knowing it be paying for day care which is 
not work-related, if it was incurred at all. In fact, as the 
order is worded, one could interpret that wording so as to re-
quire that Defendant make the day care payment even when the 
children are with him in Utah. Record at 259-261. This would 
mean a wind fall to Plaintiff as she may not actually be incur-
ring these expenses. 
The record of the case below shows that such abuses have 
occurred. Record at 253 - 254, 256 - 257, and 259 - 261. Plain-
tiff attempted to charge Defendant for day care expenses while 
she was on her honeymoon with her new husband. Transcript at 22 
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and 24. The statute clearly states that if "the actual 
expense ... ceases to be incurred, the obligor may suspend making 
monthly payment of that expense...". 78-45-7.16(2). In order to 
do that, Defendant has a right to know when such expenses are not 
actual 1y incurred. 
Finally on this issue, the court erred in allowing Plaintiff 
to bring an action to require ongoing private school for the 
younger child, despite public school being available, by way of 
an order to show cause. The order to show cause, by its very 
nature shifts the burden of proof upon the Defendant, who would 
have no knowledge of the problems of the minor child involved nor 
would Defendant have any ability to develop the proof, such as 
expert or medical testimony, to refute the allegations. Plain-
tiff, being the proponent of the request and being the one with 
access to the needs and concerns of that child should be the 
burden of proving the need. To hold otherwise places the Defend-
ant in a totally untenable position. 
Is private school reasonable? There is no evidence in the 
record that the younger child is disabled or dysfunction, nor is 
he. Under these circumstances, private school is not reasonable. 
III. IT WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO SIGN 
AND ENTER FINDINGS OF FACT AFTER AN ORAL PRONOUNCEMENT OF ITS 
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FINDINGS WHICH CONTAIN PROVISIONS WHICH WERE NOT ENUNCIATED BY 
THE COURT AT THE TIME IT ANNOUNCED ITS FINDINGS AND WHICH WERE 
PROPERLY OBJECTED TO BY A PARTY. 
The trial court made oral findings of fact at the time of 
trial, pursuant to Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Counsel for the Plaintiff prepared written findings, supposedly 
based upon the oral announcements of the court and submitted them 
to the court for signature. 
Those findings contained a number of additional paragraphs 
and items which were not included in the oral findings of the 
court as reflected by the transcript of those pronouncements. 
Defendant made a timely objection to those inappropriate conclu-
sions and the findings were signed and entered over those objec-
tions. That was clearly erroneous and should be reversed. See, 
Maughn. Further, this court is not limited to the written find-
ings and may properly examine those findings expressed from the 
bench by way of the transcript. Merriam v. Merriam, 799 P. 2d 
1172 (Utah App. 1990). 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant should be awarded extended visitation as recom-
mended by Commissioner Arnett, to wit, one-half of the school 
summer vacation. This visitation should begin immediately and 
there should be no splitting of the children during these periods 
of visitation. Such an order would best serve the purpose of 
fostering the children's relationship with their father. 
The order of day care as set forth by the trial court is 
erroneous and should be set aside. Plaintiff should have to 
abide by the statute in providing proof of actually incurred 
work-related day care expenses. This is required so as to pro-
tect Defendant from continued abuses of the day care charges and 
potential wind fall profits to Plaintiff to Defendant's detri-
ment. The day care should be limited to services provided to the 
children and not for housekeeping, "on call" or other non-child 
care activities. Further, the trial court should not be allowed 
to consider income, other than that equivalent to one full-time 
employment, in determining day care awards without a properly 
developed history of that secondary income. 
The written findings of fact submitted by the Plaintiff and 
signed entered by the trial judge must be amended to conform to 
the oral findings set forth by the trial judge as reflected by 
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the transcript of the proceedings. 
^ t-4-oH this day of November, 1992 Respectfully submitted this w 
KATHRYN S. DENHOLM, ESQ. 
Attorney for Defendant / Appellant 
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SHARON A. DONOVAN (0901) 
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Attorneys for Plaintiff 
310 South Main, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-6383 
. iLtU IN CLERK b ut-MOu 
Salt Lake County Utah 
JUN 2 9 1992 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oOo 
LISA FITHIAN (HARTWIG), 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DAVID HARTWIG, 
Defendant. 
ORDER MODIFYING 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 894900194 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
-oOo 
Both parties' Petitions for Modification of Decree of Divorce 
came on regularly for trial on April 2, 1992, before the Honorable 
Anne M. Stirba, one of the Judges of the above-entitled Court, 
Plaintiff appearing in person and by and through her attorney, 
Sharon A. Donovan, and Defendant appearing in person and by and 
through his attorney, Kathryn S. Denholm, and the Court having 
heard testimony of Plaintiff and Defendant and having received 
documentary evidence, and counsel for the parties having met in 
chambers and having resolved certain visitation issues and 
submitted the issue of summer visitation and amount of day care to 
the Court, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, and 
the Court having made and entered its written Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law herein, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AMI > I*«'»« FFHI <is 
n 
The Defendan* odified as follows: 
\lternate school breaks, m , .« exceed 
in* 
.L'-hal^oi i m Christmas 
Day uw ^eluded Defendant's v si-a . . period 
odd-numbei t"i yet : further 
provision that tJ «.- children 
-1,i istiik,r:. Pve or C h r i s t m a s i - . 
i hi, I I!,. efendant shall have 
b o t h of the c h i l d r e n for t - * . bin Ls Plaint i!l 
shall i JN-i "i, '" f it the r o u n d - t r i p ticket. * <^ r - - s e c o n d b l o c k 
of t i m e tor the > i mi • o n e - h a l f of 
other visits throughout the- year , .*. : : ; v.. 
1 ( l;I) i)(H' I Oik! 
Defendant sha 
and thereafter i Ma 2 .• . . *-* 
r uqu i L t1 • I -' i sun * -
D. Commencing ummer 
visitation for t w»i tliree-week periods, and this 
visits uiiui each child reaches the 
age r* rune. As eacn ; * -i ^ u m s .t * 
n biidxx increase _. s; < weeks, with two blocks 
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of time and with no block of time being longer than one 
month. 
E. One long weekend not to exceed six days only 
during the time the children would not be in school, upon 
reasonable notice. Defendant shall pay for the 
transportation costs for the visit. 
F. Reasonable weekly telephone visitation with the 
parties children on Sunday evenings at 8:00, Salt Lake 
City time, provided that Defendant pay the costs thereof. 
G. Reasonable visitation in the home state of the 
children, upon fourteen days notice, as long as the 
visitation does not interfere with previously scheduled 
activities, i.e., Defendant to transport the children to 
and from any previously planned activities. 
H. The parties shall split the transportation 
costs for Christmas and shall obtain the best fare 
possible, with the parties exchanging the information 
necessary by the deadline necessary in order to obtain 
the cheapest fare. 
I. Defendant shall drop the children off to 
Plaintiff's husband, babysitter or relative. 
2. Defendant should be required to pay an additional $258.75 
per month for day care, until the Montessori education is 
concluded, for a total of $508.75 per month, commencing in April, 
1992. When the child ceases the Montessori experience, then that 
3 
wi 1 1 be reduced down ]»,,' o n e - h a l f of the t > l a l "Mi t iu i ' f $?65.00 
p e i IIP »iit f i
 f lii V * '»"> ^f* ptjr month tin day c a r e . 
3 . Each par ty s h a l l pay t In 11 nwn a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s incurred 
h e r e i n . 
i L ^ C day of " ^ > ^ — ^ - ^ — ^ , 1992 . 
BY Tiff ^OURT: 
Approved as In h i ni 
ANNE M. STIRBA 
District Court Imlqe „. 
;.,V i 
KATHRYN S. DENHOLM 
Attorney for Defendant 
<-fcD IN CLERK b urj-i^u 
Salt Lake County Utah 
JUN 2 9 1992 
SHARON A. DONOVAN (0901) 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
310 South Main, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-6383 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oOo 
LISA FITHIAN (HARTWIG), 
-<?.4 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DAVID HARTWIG, 
Defendant, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 894900194 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
-0O0-
Both parties* Petitions for Modification of Decree of Divorce 
came on regularly for trial on April 2, 1992, before the Honorable 
Anne M. Stirba, one of the Judges of the above-entitled Court, 
Plaintiff appearing in person and by and through her attorney, 
Sharon A. Donovan, and Defendant appearing in person and by and 
through his attorney, Kathryn S. Denholm, and the Court having 
heard testimony of Plaintiff and Defendant and having received 
documentary evidence, and counsel for the parties having met in 
chambers and having resolved certain visitation issues and 
submitted the issue of summer visitation and amount of day care to 
the Court, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, does 
now make, adopt and find the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
i in- 'purl, imris that «\ii i about August ?.?, 1990, 
Decree of Divorce was entered , which provided, 
irU'V.nit Darl .is follows: 
Custody/Visitation. rlaintiff was awarded the 
permanent care, custody and control of the parties' two 
minor children, Benjamin James Hartwig, age 5, born on 
October 17, 1984, and Nathan Meade Hartwig, age 
on January 19, 1987, subject to specified rights 
visitation on behalf of Defendant as follows: 
A. Alternate weekends, from Friday at 6:00 p.m. to 
Sunday -v 6 ; 0 0 p.m. 
B. Alternate holidays, with the following 
holidays: New Years Day; Martin Luther King Jr. Day; 
President's Day; Easter; Memorial Day; Independence Day; 
Pioneer Day; Labor Day; Columbus Day; Halloween; 
Veterans' Day; and Thanksgiving Day. 
C. ' vening on the off week from 5:30 p.m. *"~ 
8:30 p.m. 
D. Christmas ba_y iiw*n 6:00 p. in, through December 
26th at 8:00 p.m. 
E. Prior to the children entering school, two one-
week blocks in the summer, with notification by June 15th 
for 1990 and thereafter by May 1st of each year. Once 
the children reach the age of nine, Defendant shall be 
entitled to have the chi ldren for six weeks in the 
summei
 (l not to exceed four weeks: for one visitation 
block. 
F. Upon the children entering school, one-half of 
the Christmas break and one month in the summer for two 
two-week periods of time. In the event that the children 
are in year-round school, Defendant shall be entitled to 
one-half of all breaks, with no block to exceed two weeks 
at a time and not to exceed one month total on an annual 
basis prior to the children reaching nine years of age, 
or to exceed six weeks total on an annual basis after the 
children reach the age of nine, not to exceed four weeks 
for one visitation block. 
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G. Each Father's Day, regardless of whose weekend 
upon which this holiday may fall. 
H. Each Mother's Day will be with the Plaintiff, 
regardless whose weekend upon which this holiday may 
fall. 
I. The afternoon and evening of each child's 
birthday, or one day in the same week as that child's 
birthday as determined by the child. 
J. If Defendant works every weekend as his primary 
job and primary source of income, he shall be entitled to 
one overnight visitation per week on a consistent night 
to be agreed between the parties. At such time as 
Defendant no longer works every weekend as his primary 
job and primary source of income, the other visitation 
provisions provided herein, i.e., alternate weekends, one 
evening on the off week, etc., should be implemented. 
K. The parties shall have equal access to medical, 
school records and other important records for the 
children. Plaintiff shall sign any releases that are 
necessary to allow the children's school to provide 
Defendant with a schedule of all the upcoming school 
activities. In the event any significant school or 
social events occur that are not on the schedule, 
Plaintiff shall provide Defendant reasonable notice in 
advance of those activities. Defendant shall be notified 
of non-routine medical treatment and shall have access to 
the children's medical files. 
L. Each party shall keep the other advised of 
their current address and telephone numbers, as well as 
that same information concerning the children's regular 
care givers. Neither party shall move their residence 
outside Salt Lake County without thirty (30) days prior 
written notice to the other party. 
Child Support. Defendant was ordered to pay a base 
amount of child support in the amount of $140.50 per 
month, per child, for a total of $281.00 per month. In 
addition, Defendant was ordered to pay up to $250.00 per 
month for his one-half portion of the reasonable work-
related day care, and there was a cap of $250.00 for the 
day care expenses, for a total monthly support of 
$531.00, after giving^ Defendant a credit for medical 
insurance premiums of $50.00 per month for the children. 
Said support was to be paid through the Clerk of the 
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Court, one-half on the 5th and 20th days of each month, 
until the children reach the age of eighteen and graduate 
from high school in their expected senior year, 
2. • Since the entry nf ihe Decree , i 
:umstances ¥ parties have materially and substantially 
changed, inc. , m i ml i n the following: 
• A. Plaintiff has reman ied and at l.hu .-. • <l of 
moved t o I, lie State of California with her 
- husband unl I In1 i "li i I ih IMI wli* "i »» li"! new husband is 
starting Theology Schoc , Plaintiff's employment a 
Ml iat u of U'taa wab cii^ w *** Llie process of being phased 
out. 
li, After' t l ic move? t o C a l i f o r n i a , P l a i n t i f f was 
period •* .* employed, 
earning a gross income of .n is 
less than what she? was earning *\ * : r the entry 
•' 1 * |i^  i u i • i t i c. t" l,11 V.Ji i - - \ fM-r month 
The day care expenses lM,'n 1I,I , 
substantial] increased and have gone from approximately 
includes Montessori 
prescho au i d,i * expenses 
, & axsv higher , ilifornia, with Plaintifx -» 
mortgage payment. m LUX. a vci>r 
modest home. 
'•••'^diii ud$ remarried and h i s income has 
i n c r e a s e d s i n c e t h e e n t r y cm mm IU>I net 11 if Hi vim it -MI 
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the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce, his 
income was $1,988,00, His present income is $2,370.00 
per month, and pursuant to Defendant's testimony, he also 
earned approximately $5,000.00 in 1991 from his private 
law practice, after business expenses. 
3. The Court finds that the parties have had ongoing 
problems with visitation, but the parties have stipulated to the 
following visitation: 
A. Alternate school breaks, not to exceed a one-
month block. 
B. One-half of the Christmas break, with Christmas 
Day to be included in Defendant's visitation period in 
odd-numbered years beginning in 1993, with the further 
provision that the children not be required to travel on 
Christmas Eve or Christmas Day. 
C. In the summer of 1992, Defendant should have 
both of the children for two two-week blocks. Plaintiff 
should pay for the round-trip ticket for the second block 
of time for the children, in addition to one-half of two 
other visits throughout the year, as stated in paragraph 
3(G) below. 
Defendant should notify Plaintiff by May 15, 1992, 
and thereafter by May 1st of each year of the times 
requires for summer visitation. 
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D. One long weekend not to exceed { 
during the time the children would not be in school, upon 
reasonable i M »I J *.:«• IIMIMMIHII h^< niil be ordered to pay 
for the transportation costs for I; lie visit:, 
E. Reasonable weekly telephone visitation with the 
parties chI Idren on is .J n. I. i» • u v111 r,. \ •, i, s,;i 11. Lake 
City time, provided that Defendant pay the costs thereof. 
F. RfNisoai'l'" 11" visitation i r« the hunm* state of i ii*1 
children, upon fourteen days mil i. . is i •«i•< 1 II 
visitation does not interfere with previously scheduled 
, " , defendant to transport the children to 
and from any previously planned act i il i e. 
b Hie parties should split the transportation 
costs I i l.r it,I ' i, obtain the best fare 
possible, with the parties exchanging tins informal i m 
!essary liy the -'leadline necessary in order to obtain 
the cheapest t ,-.* * 
n efendant shoull drop the children off I • 
"Minfitf msband, babysitter or lelative. 
11 i! i-i|iinl summer 
visitation issu^ tha !son custodial parent cnti *-: n 
!
 \M court views v sitation issues 
light ci wna* is . ?;,, oest interests .- • - .u 
of the non-custodial pouse's parents' entitlemer' reasonable 
visitation. n parties have agreed that fur 
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1992, there may be two two-week periods for both of these children 
and that it seems to be in the best interests of the children and 
reasonable in light of the stipulation of the parties. 
With regard to subsequent years, the Court finds that 
visitation must be set in recognition of the rights of the natural 
parents and what is in the best interests of the children. In 
making such orders, the Court considers the age of the children, 
the relationship of the children to the non-custodial parent, the 
stability of the home environment of the non-custodial parent and 
other issues that pertain to what is in the best interests of the 
children regarding visitation. In the Court's view, age is a 
significant factor, and the ages of the children, Nathan having 
just turned five in January, 1992, and Ben being seven years old at 
this time. 
The Court finds that it is reasonable to change visitation 
during the summer months gradually, rather than making a 
significant change from two two-week periods to all of a sudden a 
volume of a six week period of time, from the four-week period of 
block of time, or even as Defendant has requested, even six weeks 
at a time. After hearing all of the testimony in this matter, the 
Court does not believe that it is in the best interests of these 
children, given their ages and given the fact that they have not 
had the opportunity to have visitation with their father for more 
than one week to ten days at a time to date. 
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Defendant testified that one of the reasons he wanted a larger 
block of time for visitation was due to his work schedule, and he 
also felt that it would benefit the children to be able to spend a 
larger block of time with him and that he would attempt to arrange 
his work schedule. The Court finds, however, that if because of 
his work schedule there were other problems and he were not able to 
fulfill the four-week arrangement, that he would then return the 
children to the natural mother. The Court has some concerns about 
that arrangement in and of itself, because even if Defendant would 
be able to make those kinds of changes, once the children have it 
in their minds and expectation of a certain period, then obviously 
the Court finds it is in the best interests to fulfill that 
expectation so long as there aren't other problems that would 
outweigh that in any particular circumstance. 
Defendant has proposed larger blocks of time because he wants 
to be able to do things with the children, such as take off work 
and do things with them and he felt that longer blocks of time 
would be valuable in and of themselves. The Court has considered 
that issue, as well. The Court has also heard evidence from the 
Plaintiff concerning Defendant's marital situation and the problems 
he experienced in the marriage and arguments that have ensued 
between Defendant and his current wife in front of the children in 
the summer of 1992. This was not disputed by Defendant. 
In light of the ages of the children and their best interests, 
the Court specifically finds that after 1992, the summer visitation 
8 
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should occur in a gradual fashion and increase in length of time, 
until they reach the age of nine. The Court finds that Plaintiff's 
proposal is reasonable in this matter, and the Court finds that 
there should be two three-week periods in 1993, and that visitation 
should continue until each child reaches the age of nine. The 
Court finds that as each child turns the age of nine, the 
visitation should increase to six weeks, with two blocks of time 
and with no block of time being longer than one month. The Court 
specifically recommends that there will be a period of time when 
the older child will be staying longer and the younger child would 
come home. The Court finds, however, that a nine year old can 
better handle a longer period of visitation than a seven year old 
could under the same circumstances. The Court finds that it is 
important for the parties to encourage communication with the 
children. 
5. With regard to the day care issue, the Court has 
considered the testimony that has been presented and arguments of 
counsel with regard to this particular issue. The Court finds that 
Defendant has been paying $250.00 per month, which is less than 
one-half of the actual day care costs incurred by Plaintiff when 
she resided in Utah. That was the amount that the parties agreed 
to at the time of the divorce. Plaintiff's day care expenses now 
amount to $1,017.15 per month, with $265.00 going towards payment 
of the Montessori Preschool/day care tuition. The Court believes 
that is a reasonable amount for Montessori tuition. The Court is 
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aware that when Nathan enters kindergarten that the Montessori 
school amount should disappear because when he goes to 
kindergarten, presumably at a public school, that tuition amount 
will no longer apply. It is not clear, based upon the testimony, 
as to when Nathan will go to kindergarten, but when he does, that 
expense should no longer exist. 
The Court finds that if the preschool expense for Montessori 
continues after Nathan enters kindergarten, that issue should be 
reserved by this Court, with Plaintiff to present justification at 
that time if she feels it appropriate for him to continue to go to 
a Montessori program and require Defendant to pay one-half of the 
costs thereof, which may be done by way of Order to Show Cause. 
With regard to the other child care expense, that amount is 
$752.50 according to Plaintiff's testimony. First of all, with 
regard to Plaintiff's mother-in-law who resides with the parties in 
California, the Court is not persuaded that expenses of child care 
represented in Plaintiff's figures covers any expenses for 
Plaintiff's mother-in-law, who is elderly (age 83), but self-
sufficient. There is no credible evidence otherwise, and the Court 
finds that that amount does not pertain to the care, and whatever 
care is attributable in the family, not to the mother-in-law. 
Second of all, with regard to whether the mother-in-law could 
step up and be a child care provider, the Court finds that the 
custodial parent has to have discretion in determining who is to 
care for the children. Obviously, part or some of the functions of 
10 
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this child care provider goes to things that the mother-in-law is 
not able to provide, specifically, transporting the children to and 
from Spanish lessons, karate lessons, baseball games, try-out 
practices and that sort of thing, and there may be others. Some 
discussion has to be given to the child care so that it is apparent 
who is best able to provide appropriate chid care. In this 
particular circumstance, the Court is satisfied that there has not 
been an unreasonable decision in not choosing the mother-in-law to 
care for the children, but that that person could look to outside 
care. 
The Court finds that $752.50 per month is a reasonable amount 
of expense to pay on a monthly basis for in-home child care, 
especially in light of the duties that were testified to in Court, 
namely, getting the children ready for school; getting them 
breakfast; taking the children to school; bringing the children 
home from school; providing lunch for the child that comes home 
midday; taking the children to these various activities; and 
attending to their laundry. The Court is aware of what laundry the 
children could generate, and household disarray that they could 
create, taking care of the home insofar as it relates to the child 
care. There is no credible evidence otherwise in this Court's view 
that the day care expense was in part attributable to other 
household duties. All of the evidence that has been presented to 
the Court really indicates- that the child care provider is, in 
fact, providing child care and not providing other household 
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duties. Therefore, The Court finds that the child care expense of 
$752.50 per month is reasonable and also necessary to provide child 
care. The Court finds that that covers everything with regard to 
the child care expense. 
Accordingly, the testimony of Defendant was that it would be 
difficult for him to come up with the extra money, but the Court is 
satisfied that there is an ability to pay, to contribute the 
additional amounts towards child care expense. The Court finds 
that $1,117.50 is a reasonable amount of total monthly child care 
under the circumstances and for the reasons indicated previously, 
and therefore, until the Montessori education is concluded, 
Defendant should be required to pay an additional $258.75 per 
month, for a total of $508.75 per month, which is half of that 
amount for day care, to commence with the month of April, 1992. 
When the child ceases the Montessori experience, then that will be 
reduced down by one-half of the total tuition of $265.00, or a 
reduction to $376.25 per month for day care. 
With regard to someone being in the home at times when the 
child is not at home, the Court finds that there is not anything 
unusual about that particular practice here, given the fact that 
that person has to be on call in case a child is sick or that 
provides an opportunity of time in which to take care of other 
child-related issues at home. The Court does not think that is 
unreasonable under the circumstances. This again may change when 
the children are in school full-time. The Court finds that there 
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will have to be a re-evaluation of this at that time because 
presumably the child care expense would be substantially affected 
by having two children in school full-time. There is no evidence 
before the Court on which to rule on that particular issue now. 
6. The Court finds that Plaintiff has had great difficulty 
in collecting the work-related day care expenses. 
7. The Court further finds that the parties have agreed that 
they should each pay their own attorney's fees incurred herein. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and 
adopts its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Defendant's visitation shall be modified as follows: 
A. Alternate school breaks, not to exceed a one-
month block. 
B. One-half of the Christmas break, with Christmas 
Day to be included in Defendant's visitation period in 
odd-numbered years beginning in 1993, with the further 
provision that the children not be required to travel on 
Christmas Eve or Christmas Day. 
C. In the summer of 1992, Defendant shall have 
both of the children for two two-week blocks. Plaintiff 
shall pay for the round-trip ticket for the second block 
of time for the children, in addition to one-half of two 
other visits throughout the year, as stated in paragraph 
1(G) below. 
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Defendant shall notify Plaintiff by May 15, 1992, 
and thereafter by May 1st of each year of the times 
requires for summer visitation. 
D. Commencing in 1993, Defendant shall have summer 
visitation for two three-week periods, and this 
visitation should continue until each child reaches the 
age of nine. As each child turns the age of nine, the 
visitation shall increase to six weeks, with two blocks 
of time and with no block of time being longer than one 
month. 
E. One long weekend not to exceed six days only 
during the time the children would not be in school, upon 
reasonable notice. Defendant shall pay for the 
transportation costs for the visit. 
F. Reasonable weekly telephone visitation with the 
parties children on Sunday evenings at 8:00, Salt Lake 
City time, provided that Defendant pay the costs thereof. 
G. Reasonable visitation in the home state of the 
children, upon fourteen days notice, as long as the 
visitation does not interfere with previously scheduled 
activities, i.e., Defendant to transport the children to 
and from any previously planned activities. 
H. The parties shall split the transportation 
costs for Christmas and shall obtain the best fare 
possible, with the parties exchanging the information 
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necessary by the deadline necessary in order to obtain 
the cheapest fare. 
I. Defendant shall drop the children off to 
Plaintiffs husband, babysitter or relative. 
2. Defendant should be required to pay an additional $258.75 
per month for day care, until the Montessori education is 
concluded, for a total of $508.75 per month, commencing in April, 
1992. When the child ceases the Montessori experience, then that 
will be reduced down by one-half of the total tuition of $265.00 
per month, to $37 6.25 per month for day care. 
3. Each party shall pay their own attorney•s fees incurred 
herein, 
, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
DATED this day of \_^L-#*SL— 
Approved as to form: 
ANNE M. STIRBA 
D i s t r i c t Couri—Jjadge 
'vO1' 
KATHRYN S. DENHOLM 
Attorney for Defendant 
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JUDGEMENT 
SHARON A. DONOVAN (0901) 
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
310 South Main, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-6383 
By 
HUD DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
AUG 2 2 1990 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
0»puly Ctorfc 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oOo 
LISA HARTWIG, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
DAVID HARTWIG, 
Defendant. 
SA59IOS 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 894900194 
Judge Leonard H. Russon 
-0O0-
This matter having come on regularly for Pre-Trial 
Settlement Conference on May 8, 1990, before Commissioner 
Sandra N. Peuler, Judge Pro Tern of the above-entitled Court, 
Plaintiff appearing in person and by and through her 
attorney, Sharon A. Donovan, and Defendant appearing in 
person and by and through his attorney, Kathryn Schuler 
Denholm, and counsel for both parties having met with the 
Court in chambers to advise the Court of the issues remaining 
to be resolved, and thereafter both counsel having discussed 
and resolved these matters with the parties involved herein, 
and the agreement of the parties having been read into the 
record in the presence of Plaintiff and Defendant, and 
Plaintiff and Defendant having confirmed said agreement and 
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Defendant having agreed to withdraw his pleadings on file 
herein, and Plaintiff having been sworn and examined on the 
basis of the Complaint, and the Court having made and entered 
herein its written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
and upon motion of Sharon A. Donovan of Dart, Adamson & 
Kasting, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED as follows: 
1. Divorce. The Plaintiff be and she is hereby 
awarded a Decree of Divorce from the Defendant upon the 
grounds of irreconcilable differences, and the marriage 
between Plaintiff and Defendant be and the same is hereby 
dissolved, and the parties are hereby free and absolutely 
released from the bonds of matrimony and all the obligations 
thereof with said Decree to become final upon signing and 
entry. 
2. Custody/Visitation. Plaintiff be and she is hereby 
awarded the permanent care, custody and control of the 
parties' two minor children, Benjamin James Hartwig, age 5, 
born on October 17, 1984, and Nathan Meade Hartwig, age 3, 
born on January 19, 1987, subject to Defendant's reasonable 
rights of visitation as follows: 
A. Alternate weekends, from Friday at 6:00 
p.m. to Sunday at 6:00 p.m. 
2 
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B. Alternate holidays, with the following 
holidays: New Years Day; Martin Luther King Jr. 
Day; President's Day; Easter; Memorial Day; 
Independence Day; Pioneer Day; Labor Day; Columbus 
Day; Halloween; Veterans' Day; and Thanksgiving 
Day. 
C. One evening on the off week from 5:30 
p.m. to 8:30 p.m. 
D. Christmas Day from 6:00 p.m. through 
December 2 6th at 8:00 p.m. 
E. Prior to the children entering school, 
two one-week blocks in the summer, with 
notification by June 15th for 1990 and thereafter 
by May 1st of each year. Once the children reach 
the age of nine, Defendant shall be entitled to 
have the children for six weeks in the summer, not 
to exceed four weeks for one visitation block. 
F. Upon the children entering school, one-
half of the Christmas break and one month in the 
summer for two two-week periods of time. In the 
event that the children are in year-round school, 
Defendant shall be entitled to one-half of all 
breaks, with no block to exceed two weeks at a time 
and not to exceed one month total on an annual 
3 
basis prior to the children reaching nine years of 
age, or to exceed six weeks total on an annual 
basis after the children reach the age of nine, not 
to exceed four weeks for one visitation block. 
G. Each Father's Day, regardless of whose 
weekend upon which this holiday may 'fall. 
H. Each Mother's Day will be with the 
Plaintiff, regardless whose weekend upon which this 
holiday may fall. 
I. The afternoon and evening of each child's 
birthday, or one day in the same week as that 
child's birthday as determined by the child. 
J. If Defendant works every weekend as his 
primary job and primary source of income, he shall 
be entitled to one overnight visitation per week on 
a consistent night to be agreed between the 
parties. At such time as Defendant no longer works 
every weekend as his primary job and primary source 
of income, the other visitation provisions provided 
herein, i.e., alternate weekends, one evening on 
the off week, etc., should be implemented. 
K. The parties shall have equal access to 
medical, school records and other important records 
for the children. Plaintiff shall sign any 
4 
01P1 
releases that are necessary to allow the children's 
school to provide Defendant with a schedule of all 
the upcoming school activities. In the event any 
significant school or social events occur that are 
not on the schedule, Plaintiff shall provide 
Defendant reasonable notice in advance of those 
activities. Defendant shall be notified of non-
routine medical treatment and shall have access to 
the children's medical files. 
L. Each party shall keep the other advised 
of their current address and telephone numbers, as 
well as that same information concerning the 
children's regular care givers. Neither party 
shall move their residence outside Salt Lake County 
without thirty (30) days prior written notice to 
the other party. 
3. Mutual Restraining Order. The parties are mutually 
restrained from harming, harassing, bothering the other or 
making denigrating comments about the other in front of the 
children. To the extent that they have control over any 
other third person, the parties shall restrain any third 
person from making derogatory comments about the other in the 
presence of the children. 
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4. Grandparent Visitation Rights. The maternal and 
paternal grandparents may be entitled to reasonable rights of 
visitation with the children, upon reasonable advance notice. 
Any extended visitation with the children's paternal 
grandparents shall occur during Defendant's visitation with 
them or as otherwise agreed between Plaintiff and Defendant's 
parents. Plaintiff shall not unreasonably withhold any 
consent to reasonable visitation with the paternal 
grandparents. Neither Plaintiff's nor Defendant's parents 
shall interfere with Defendant's visitation with the 
children. The grandparent visitation shall not be tacked on 
to Defendant's visitation. 
5. Child Support. Defendant shall pay a base amount 
of child support in the amount of $140.50 per month, per 
child, for a total of $281.00 per month. Defendant shall 
also pay up to $250.00 for his one-half portion of the 
reasonable work-related day care and there will be a cap of 
$250.00 per month for the day care expenses, for a total 
monthly support amount of $531.00, after giving Defendant a 
credit for medical insurance premiums of $50.00 per month for 
the children. Said child support shall be paid through the 
Clerk of the Court, one-half on the 5th and 20th days of each 
month, until the children reach the age of eighteen and 
graduate from high school in their expected senior year. 
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6. Withhold and Deliver Order. An Order to Withhold 
and Deliver, pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Section 62A-11-401, 
et. seq. , be and is hereby ordered to be issued should the 
Defendant become thirty (30) days delinquent in his child 
support obligation. 
7. Alimony. Neither party shall be awarded alimony. 
8. Real Estate. Plaintiff is hereby awarded the 
exclusive possession and use of the parties' home, based upon 
the appraisal by Jerry Webber, appraising the home for the 
sum of $62,000.00, with the appraisal cost to be born equally 
between the parties. Plaintiff shall be awarded any and all 
equity in said home, and Defendant shall Quit-Claim his 
interest in the home to Plaintiff. Plaintiff shall use her 
best efforts to release Defendant's V.A. Certificate, with 
the parties sharing equally the reasonable cost to effectuate 
the release. 
9. Personal Property, The parties' personal property 
shall be distributed as follows: 
A. To the Plaintiff: 1987 Aerostar; the 
household goods, furniture and furnishings not 
otherwise hereinbelow disposed; the children's 
goods, furniture and furnishings; her personal 
effects and belongings; the woodburning stove and 
sleeper sofa which were purchased (stove) or 
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refurnished (sofa) with funds from Defendant's 
practice, with Defendant being given a credit of 
$1,000.00 toward any child support or day care 
arrearage that may exist. 
B. To the Defendant: 1989 Mazda B2200 
pickup; the wood shelve, work bench, decorations 
and other wood items made by him; all electronics 
and radio equipment; all wood working tools and 
equipment; Sears radial arm saw; all law books; all 
equipment and materials obtained for and used in 
his practice; Osborne computer, Zenith monitor and 
Epson MX 80 printer; his medical and other books. 
C. All property and all property rights that 
may be vested in either party as a result of family 
inheritance, trusts, or similar sources shall be 
awarded to the party from whose family it was 
received. Specifically, Defendant received the 
following personal property as part of inheritance: 
circular oak table; various hand tools; large 
mechanic's style tool box on castors; shotguns, 
handgun and rifles; two end table/bookcase units; 
bohemian china set; and antique Zenith radio. 
D. Prior to the marriage, Defendant acquired 
the following items to which the Plaintiff is not 
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entitled to assert any claim: Sears color 
television; rocking chair; electronics equipment; 
Heathkit stereo receiver; Girard turntable; Akai 
reel-to-reel tape deck; three pairs of speakers; 
Sears Craftsman hand tools and tool boxes; gold 
flatware; the model railroad equipment and other 
assorted toys remaining which were saved from 
Defendant's childhood; all cameras and photographic 
equipment; Meade 3.1 inch telescope; Swift 
microscope; five drawer file cabinet; 1978 Yamaha 
750 cc motorcycle. 
10. Debts and Obligations. Each party shall pay and 
hold the other party harmless from liability on the following 
debts: 
A. The Plaintiff: her student loans; the 
mortgage payment on the house; the debt on the 1987 
Aerostar. 
B. The Defendant: his student loans; the 
debt on the 1989 Mazda. 
C. All remaining debts and obligations shall 
be the responsibility of the party as they have so 
divided it. 
D. Each party shall assume, pay and hold the 
other party harmless from liability all debts 
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incurred by that party individually since the date 
of the parties' separation on January 23, 1989. 
11. Medical Insurance. Both parties shall maintain 
coverage for the children of the parties under the group 
policy of major medical and dental insurance available to 
them through their employment while each child remains within 
the age limits allowed by this policy, with the minor 
children of the parties named as beneficiaries thereunder. 
Each party shall pay one-half of any deductible amounts 
and one-half of any uncovered medical, dental, optic or 
orthodontic expenses reasonably incurred for the benefit of 
the parties' minor children. 
12. Life Insurance. Both parties shall maintain in 
full force and effect the life insurance policies they each 
have on their lives in the amount of $100,000.00, until such 
time as the last of the parties' minor children reaches the 
age of eighteen years or is otherwise emancipated. 
During such period, each party shall designate 
irrevocably the other party as trustee for the minor children 
as sole and exclusive beneficiary on said life insurance 
policy. 
13. Pension and Related Assets. The Court finds that 
Plaintiff has a pension and/or profit sharing plan through 
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her place of employment. Plaintiff shall receive all 
benefits accrued pursuant to such plans. 
14. 1989 Tax Returns. Both parties shall file separate 
tax returns for the year 1989. 
15. Tax Exemptions. As long as Defendant is paying to 
Plaintiff $200.00 per month towards the child support and 
one-half of the work-related day care expenses and is current 
with said obligation for the preceding tax year, Defendant 
shall be entitled to claim the youngest child as a deduction 
for federal and state income tax purposes. 
16. Delinquent Support. Defendant shall pay to 
Plaintiff the sum of $2,500.00, which represents a compromise 
on the delinquent support owed to Plaintiff pursuant to the 
Temporary Order in this matter. If this amount is not paid 
to Plaintiff by December 31, 1990, a judgment will enter 
against Defendant for the unpaid balance on said sum, with 
interest running accordingly. Said $2,500.00 represents 
delinquent support through the first half of May, 1990. 
17. Maiden Name. Plaintiff is hereby restored to her 
maiden name of Mariea. 
18. Attorney's Fees and Costs. Each party shall assume 
and pay his and her own costs and attorney's fees incurred in 
prosecuting this action. 
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19. The parties be and they are each hereby ordered to 
do and perform all matters and things required by each of 
them to be done herein. 
DATED this Q2 A day of C^U^J^UL^J 1990, 
BY THE COURT: 
U^y\ a^tcK^j kiUU^U^ > 
SANDRA N. PEULER 
Judge Pro Tern 
Approved as to form: 
CLuJU 
JCHtJLtR 'DENHOLM 
Attorney for Defendant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the j7 day of August, 1990, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Decree of Divorce 
was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Kathryn Schuler Denholm 
Attorney at Law 
263 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
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ADDENDUM "B" 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HARTWIG, LISA 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
HARTWIG, DAVID 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 894900194 DA 
DATE 10/28/91 
HONORABLE THOMAS N. ARNETT 
COURT REPORTER NO TAPE 
COURT CLERK KAD 
TYPE OF HEARING: MODIFICATION/DIVORCE 
PRESENT: DEFENDANT 
P. ATTY. DONOVAN, SHARON A 
D. ATTY. DENHOLM, KATHRYN SCHULER 
COMMISSIONER CERTIFIES THIS FOR TRIAL ON THE FOLLOWING CONTESTED 
ISSUES: 
1. VISITATION. THE PARTIES HAVE STIPULATED THAT THE DECREE 
SHOULD BE MODIFIED TO PROVIDE VISITATION AS FOLLOWS: 
A. ALTERNATING SCHOOL BREAKS 
B. LONG WEEKENDS, WHEN THE CHILDREN ARE NOT IN SCHOOL AND 
TO OCCUR NO MORE THAN FOUR TO SIX WEEKS APART. 
C. NON-SCHEDULED VISITS IN THE CHILDRENS' HOME STATE WITH 
14 DAYS NOTICE AND SAID VISITS NOT TO INTERFERE WITH THE 
CHILDRENS' ACTIVITIES. 
D. TELEPHONE VISITATION TO OCCUR AT SAID DAY AND TIME. 
E. ALTERNATING CHRISTMAS WITH DEFENDANT TO BEGIN IN 1991. 
THE PARTIES COULD NOT AGREE ON SUMMER VISITATION AND THE 
COMMISSIONER RECOMMENDS THAT THE DEFENDNANT BE GRANTED ONE-
HALF OF THE SCHOOL SUMMER VACATION. 
2. PERSONS ENTITLED TO DELIVER OR PICK UP CHILDREN. COMMIS-
SIONER RECOMMENDS THAT THE PLAINTIFF'S PRESENT HUSBAND BE 
ENTITLED TO PICK-UP OR DELIVER THE CHILDREN WHEN THE PLAIN-
TIFF IS UNABLE FOR THOSE DUTIES. 
3. TRANSPORTATION COSTS. THE PARTIES DISPARITY IN INCOMES IS 
REFLECTED IN THE VERY MODEST CHILD SUPPORT AWARD, AND THE 
"CAP" ON THE DEFENDANT'S OBLIGATION TO SHARE IN THE PLAIN-
T I F F ' S CHILD CARE EXPENSES. THEREFORE, THE COMMISSIONER 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE PARTIES CONTRIBUTE EQUALLY TO TRANSPOR-
TATION COSTS FOR TWO VISITS PER YEAR. FURTHER, THAT THE 
"DESTINATION PARENT" BE THE ONE RESPONSIBLE FOR TRANSPORTA-
TION AT THE BEGINNING OR CONCLUSION OF EACH V I S I T . THIS 
RECOMMENDATION I S ALSO BASED ON THE FACT THAT THE PLAINTIFF 
MOVED TO THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA TO ENABLE HER PRESENT HUS-
BAND TO ENTER THE SEMINARY AND WAS NOT FOR THE PURPOSE OF 
INTERFERING WITH THE DEFENDANT'S VISITATION RIGHTS. 
MEDICAL EXPENSES. COMMISSIONER RECOMMENDS THAT THE PLAIN-
TIFF SUBMIT MEDICAL EXPENSES TO THE DEFENDANT WITHIN 9 0 DAYS 
THIS ISSUE MAY BE MOOT AS SET OUT BELOW. 
CHILD CARE EXPENSES. THE PARTIES HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO COOP-
ERATE BETWEEN THEMSELVES TO EFFECT PAYMENT OF PAST CHILD 
CARE EXPENSES, WITH EACH PARTY DISPUTING WHAT I S REASONABLE 
AND I T WAS WORK-RELATED. THE P L A I N T I F F ' S CURRENT CHILD CARE 
EXPENSES ARE I N EXCESS OF $ 9 0 0 . 0 0 / M O . AND THE "CAP" I N THE 
DECREE OF DIVORCE LIMITS THE TOTAL OBLIGATION ON THE PART OF THE DEFEN-
DANT TO $ 2 5 0 . 0 0 . THEREFORE, THE COMMISSIONER RECOMMENDS THAT THE 
DEFENDANT SIMPLY PAY AN ONGOING MONTHLY AMOUNT OF $ 2 5 0 . 0 0 TOWARD CHILD 
CARE EXPENSES AND THAT THE PARTIES NOT BE REQUIRED TO DEAL WITH EACH 
OTHER IN TERMS OF INVOICES OR ACCOUNTINGS. ON THE ISSUE OF PAST CHILD 
CARE EXPENSES, THE COMMISSIONER RECOMMENDS THAT THE PARTIES EXCHANGE 
ACCOUNTINGS THROUGH COUNSEL TO RESOLVE THIS MATTER. 
HEALTH INSURANCE. THE PARTIES APPARENTLY HAVE JUST LEARNED THAT THE 
DEFENDANT'S HEALTH CARE COVERAGE MAY BE RESTRICTED TO THE STATE OF 
UTAH. THEREFORE, THE COMMISSIONER RECOMMENDS THAT WHICHEVER PARTY 
CAN OBTAIN HEALTH INSURANCE AT THE LOWEST PREMIUM COMBINED WITH THE 
BEST COVERAGE SHOULD DO SO AND THE CREDIT TO THE DEFENDANT FOR HEALTH 
INSURANCE PREMIUM BE ADJUSTED I F HE IS NO LONGER THE PARENT REQUIRED TO 
CARRY THE SAME. 
ATTORNEYS FEES. THE COMMISSIONER FINDS THAT BOTH PARTIES ARE ACTING IN 
GOOD FAITH AND, THEREFORE, EACH PARTY SHOULD BE ORDERED TO ASSUME AND 
PAY HIS OR HER OWN ATTORNEYS FEES. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LISA FITHIAN (HARTWIG), 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID HARTWIG, 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CIVIL NO. B94900194 
COMMISSIONER SANDRA PEULER 
UNDER ADVISEMENT RECOMMENDATION 
COURT CLERK: SPO 
DATE: 9/29/92 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY: 
DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY: 
MOTION HEARING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
SHARON A. DONOVAN 
KATHRYN SCHULER DENHOLM 
COMMISSIONER RECOMMENDS: 
THE COMMISSIONER HAVING HEARD ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL AND 
HAVING FURTHER REVIEWED PLEADINGS FILED HEREIN, THE 
COMMISSIONER RECOMMENDS AS FOLLOWS: 
1. AS TO THE ISSUE OF CHILD SUPPORT, THE DEFENDANT SHOULD 
PROVIDE DOCUMENTATION OF PAYMENTS MADE, TO SUPPORT HIS 
ASSERTION THAT HE IS CURRENT. THE ISSUE OF ANY JUDGMENT SHOULD 
BE RESERVED AT THIS TIME, PENDING THAT ACCOUNTING BEING 
PROVIDED. COUNSEL MAY SCHEDULE A CONFERENCE CALL WITH THE 
COMMISSIONER TO CONCLUDE THIS ISSUE, IF IT REMAINS UNRESOLVED 
AFTER THE ACCOUNTING HAS BEEN DONE. 
2. AS TO CHILD CARE, THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE AWARDED A 
JUDGMENT IN THE SUM OF $369.87, REPRESENTING CHILD CARE 
EXPENSES OWED BY DEFENDANT FOR JUNE AND JULY 1992. THE 
COMMISSIONER FINDS THAT CHILD CARE EXPENSES REMAIN OWING TO THE 
PROVIDER EVEN DURING PERIODS OF VACATION OR VISITATION, IN 
ORDER TO HOLD THE CHILD'S PLACE WITH THAT PROVIDER, AND THAT 
DEFENDANT SHOULD PAY HIS SHARE. 
n o c n 
HARTWIG V. HARTWIG PAGE TWO MINUTE ENTRY 
3. AS TO CHILD CARE EXPENSES INCURRED FROM AUGUST 1992 
THROUGH THE PRESENT DATE, NO JUDGMENT SHOULD ENTER, AS THE 
COMMISSIONER FINDS THAT PLAINTIFF HAS NOT BEEN EMPLOYED. 
4. THE DEFENDANT SHOULD BE ORDERED TO REFRAIN FROM 
DEDUCTING AMOUNTS FROM COURT-ORDERED CHILD SUPPORT OR CHILD 
CARE PAYMENTS, EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY THE COURT, OR AGREED BY 
THE PARTIES. 
5. THERE IS NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE REGARDING THE ISSUE 
OF CONTEMPT; THEREFORE, NO CONTEMPT IS RECOMMENDED, 
6. THE DEFENDANT SHOULD PROVIDE HIS RESIDENCE ADDRESS TO 
PLAINTIFF, THROUGH COUNSEL. 
7. EACH PARTY SHOULD PAY HIS OR HER OWN FEES. 
PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL IS DIRECTED TO PREPARE AN ORDER 
CONSISTENT WITH THIS RECOMMENDATION. 
Z/ -~^c<\.^/'l£>^fe^S 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy, 
of the foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this 
day of September, 1992: 
Sharon A, Donovan 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
310 S. Main, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2167 
Kathryn Schuler Denholm 
Attorney for Defendant 
263 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
n?ni 
FULE0 D&Y&ff? G3HBT 
Third Judicial District 
KATHRYN SCHULER DENHOLM 0866 
Attorney for Defendant 
263 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Telephone: 484-0091 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LISA FITHIAN (HARTWIG), * OBJECTION TO PROPOSED FINDINGS, 
* CONCLUSIONS AND ORDER 
Plaintiff, * 
vs * 
DAVID HARTWIG, * Civil No. 894900194 
Defendants * Judge Stirba 
Comes now Defendant, by counsel, and objects to the proposed 
Findings, Conclusions and Order in this matter as follows: 
1. The court considered but made no finding concerning the 
contents of the Decree heretofore entered in this matter, the 
contents of which are not an appropriate part of the Findings. 
2. The court made no findings concerning the contents of 
paragraphs 2a, 2b, and a portion of 2c in the proposed findings and 
related paragraphs in the Order. Defendant specifically objects 
to the sentence in paragraph 2a "Plaintiff's employment in the 
state of Utah was also in the process of being phased out" which 
was not found by the Court and the sentence "the overall cost of 
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MAY 1 3 1992 
ay. 
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DiputyClwK 
living . . . for a very modest home". 
3. Defendant further proposes that the Court find, as a part 
of paragraph 2c that the children had a full time inhouse day care 
provider in Utah, but did not attend Montessori in Utah. 
4. Defendant objects to the two full paragraphs beginning at 
the top of page 8 of the proposed Findings of Fact and the related 
provisions in the Conclusions and Order. These paragraphs are 
direct quotes from Judge Stirba's comments and reflect her thought 
processes rather than findings in this matter; in faqt, her 
findings are contained in the next succeeding paragraph. 
5. Defendant objects to the phrase in paragraph 5 "which is 
less than one-half the actual day care costs incurred by Plaintiff 
when she resided in Utah" which phrase is not included in the 
judge's comments and which is, in fact, not accurate in that the 
Plaintiff's day care expenses at the time the Decree of Divorce was 
entered were adjusted in part by reason of the fact that Plaintiff 
received house keeping benefits from the day care provider, and in 
part because Defendant's income was substantially less than 
Plaintiff's. 
6. Defendant objects to paragraph 6 for the reason that the 
same was not found by the court and is not, in fact, accurate. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant having specified his objections to the 
proposed Findings, Conclusions and Order, prays that an Order enter 
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consistent with these objections. 
DATED this \J> day of May, 1992, 
enholm 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Objection to Sharon Donovan, Attorney for Plaintiff, at 310 South 
Main, Suite 1330, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 on this day of 
May, 1992. 
Secretary 
|MtkWi 
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ADDENDUM "C" 
^uoundjjxe visitation should be defined as the parents may agree. 
If they are not able to agree, reasonable visitation will routinely be 
defined for school-age (beginning kindergarten) children as follows: 
1. Alternate 
Weekends: 
2. Midweek: 
3. Holidays: 
4. Father's 
Mother's 
Day-
Day: 
5. Birthdays: 
Friday 6 p.m. - Sunday 6 p.m. 
alternate Wednesday, 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m. 
(A^Christmas - non-custodial parent to have 
Christmas day beginning at 1:00 p.m. and continuing 
through 1/2 of the child's total Christmas school 
vacation. 
(B) Thanksgiving and Easter - non-custodial parent 
to have Thanksgiving in even years (1990, 92, 94, 
etc.); Thanksgiving holiday is Wednesday 6 p.m. 
until Sunday 6 p.m. Non-custodial parent to have 
Easter in odd years (1991, 93, 95, etc.); Easter 
holiday is Friday 6 p.m. until Sunday 6 p.m. 
(C) Other Holidays - New Year's Day, Martin Luther 
King Day, President's Day, Memorial Day, July 4th, 
July 24th and Labor Day. These are to be 
alternated, with the non-custodial parent to have 
visitation beginning 6 p.m. the day before the 
holiday until 6 p.m. on the holiday. 
Holidays take precedence over the weekend visitation 
and no changes should be made to the regular 
rotation of the alternating weekend schedule. 
as appropriate, 6 p.m. the day before until 6 
p.m. the day of. 
one evening, 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m. during the 
week of the child's birthday and the non-custodial 
parent's birthday. 
6. Extended 
visitation: (A) Summer - 4 weeks continuous, with written 
notice of dates provided to custodial parent by May 
1st. Custodial parent to have alternate weekends, 
holiday and phone visitation. 
(B) Year Round school - two 2 week periods, with 
written notice of dates to custodial parent at least 
30 days prior to visitation. Custodial parent to 
have holiday and phone visitation. 
(C) Each parent shall be allowed two weeks per year 
uninterrupted possession of the children for 
purposes of vacation, provided the same does not 
interfere with holiday visitation per above. Each 
parent shall notify the other in writing of such two 
week period at least 30 days in advance. 
Telephone: reasonable, before 8 p.m. 
8. Other times as agreed. 
30-3-4.1 HUSBAND AND WIFE 
30-3-4.1 to 30-3-4.4. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1990, ch 230, § 4 repeals authority, duties, and jurisdiction of court com-
these sections, as last amended by L 1989, ch. missioners, effective April 23, 1990 
104, §§ 2 to 5, providing for the appointment, 
30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and health 
care of parties and children — Division of debts 
— Court to have continuing jurisdiction — Cus-
tody and visitation — Termination of alimony — 
Nonmeritorious petition for modification. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equita-
ble orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. 
The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and 
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the 
purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental 
care insurance for the dependent children; and 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment 
of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or 
incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or 
obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabil-
ities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order 
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses 
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment 
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circum-
stances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately 
cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide 
the day care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or 
training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or 
new orders for the support and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the 
children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, or the dis-
tribution of the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and neces-
sary. 
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other 
relatives, the court shall consider the welfare of the child. 
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of 
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically termi-
nates upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage 
is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if 
the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his 
rights are determined. 
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(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former 
spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if it is further 
established by the person receiving alimony that that relationship or associa-
tion is without any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume. 
(7) When a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions 
of a court order is made and denied, the court may order the petitioner to pay 
the reasonable attorney's fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, 
if the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted in 
good faith. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1212; L. 
1909, ch. 109, § 4; C.L. 1917, § 3000; R.S. 
1933 & C. 1943, 40-3-5; L. 1969, ch. 72, § 3; 
1975, ch. 81, § 1; 1979, ch. 110, § 1; 1984, ch. 
13, § 1; 1985, ch. 72, § 1; 1985, ch. 100, § 1; 
1991, ch. 257, § 4. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
ment, effective April 29, 1991, inserted "debts 
or obligations" in the introductory paragraph 
of Subsection (1), added Subsection (l)(c), and 
inserted "and obligations for debts" near the 
end of Subsection (3). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Alimony. 
—Amount. 
—"Equitable restitution." 
—Modification. 
—Standard of living. 
—Termination. 
—Waiver. 
Appeal and review. 
—Findings required. 
Children. 
—Custody. 
Modification. 
—Support. 
Availability. 
Effect of child's absence. 
"In-kind" agreement. 
Modification. 
Costs. 
—Partnership. 
Court's powers and jurisdiction. 
Property division. 
—Advanced degrees. 
—Antenuptial agreement. 
—Closely-held corporations. 
—Contributions. 
—Discretion of court. 
—Gifts. 
—Partnership. 
—Postnuptial agreement. 
—Professional practice. 
—Retirement funds. 
—Right to reproduce creative work. 
—Time of valuation. 
—Valuation. 
Res judicata. 
Stipulations and agreements of parties. 
Visitation rights. 
Cited. 
Alimony. 
Alimony should, so far as possible, equalize 
the parties' standards of living. Munns v. 
Munns, 790 P.2d 116 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Proper distribution of property interests of 
one sort or another should come first, and only 
then would alimony need to be considered. 
Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). 
Exact equality of income is not required, but 
sufficient parity to allow both parties to be on 
equal footing financially as of the time of the 
divorce is required. Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 
1209 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 
327 (Utah 1991). 
Divorce decree provision requiring the hus-
band to continue to pay utilities for as long as 
the wife lived at the marital residence was in 
the nature of continuing spousal support and, 
therefore, considered to be alimony. Hagan v. 
Hagan, 810 P.2d 478 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Usually the needs of the spouses are assessed 
in light of the standard of living they had dur-
ing marriage. In some circumstances, it may be 
appropriate to try to equalize the spouses' re-
spective standards of living. Martinez v. 
Martinez, 818 P.2d 538 (Utah 1991). 
When a marriage of long duration dissolves 
on the threshold of a major change in the in-
come of one of the spouses due to the collective 
efforts of both, that change, unless unrelated to 
the efforts put forward by the spouses during 
marriage, should be given some weight in fash-
ioning the support award. Thus, if one spouse's 
earning capacity has been greatly enhanced 
through the efforts of both spouses during the 
marriage, it may be appropriate for the trial 
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78-45-7.4. Obligation — Adjusted gross income used. 
Adjusted gross income shall be used in calculating each parents share of 
the child support award. Only income of the natural or adoptive parents of the 
child may be used to determine the award under these guidelines. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.4, enacted by L. came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
1989, ch. 214, § 6. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 214 be-
78-45-7.5. Determination of gross income — Imputed in-
come. 
(1) As used in the guidelines "gross income" includes: 
(a) prospective income from any source, including nonearned sources, 
except under Subsection (3); and 
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents, 
gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest, 
trust income, alimony from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains, 
social security benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unemployment 
compensation, disability insurance benefits, and payments from 
"nonmeans-tested" government programs. 
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the equivalent of one 
full-time job. 
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are: 
(a) Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC); 
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job Train-
ing Partnership Act, S.S.I., Medicaid, Food Stamps, or General Assis-
tance; and 
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent. 
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall 
be calculated by subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employ-
ment or business operation from gross receipts. The income and expenses 
from self-employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed to 
determine an appropriate level of gross income available to the parent to 
satisfy a child support award. Only those expenses necessary to allow the 
business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from gross 
receipts. 
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from the 
amount of business income determined for tax purposes. 
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual 
basis and then recalculated to determine the average gross monthly in-
come. 
(b) Each parent shall provide suitable documentation of current earn-
ings, including year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements. Each par-
ent shall supplement documentation of current earnings with copies of 
tax returns from at least the most recent year to provide verification of 
earnings over time and shall document income from nonearned sources 
according to the source. Verification of income from records maintained 
by the Office of Employment Security may be substituted for employer 
statements and income tax returns. 
665 
78-45-7.5 JUDICIAL CODE 
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether 
an underemployment or overemployment situation exists. 
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection 
(7). 
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates 
to the amount imputed or a hearing is held and a finding made that the 
parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. 
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon 
employment potential and probable earnings as derived from work his-
tory, occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of 
similar backgrounds in the community. 
(c) If a parent has no recent work history, income shall be imputed at 
least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. To impute a 
greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer 
in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as to 
the evidentiary basis for the imputation. 
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist: 
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor children 
> approach or equal the amount of income the custodial parent can 
earn; 
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he 
cannot earn minimum wage; 
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to estab-
lish basic job skills; or 
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the 
custodial parent's presence in the home. 
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a child who is the 
subject of a child support award, nor benefits to a child in the child's own 
right, such as Supplemental Security Income. 
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a 
parent may be credited as child support to the parent upon whose earning 
record it is based, by crediting the amount against the potential obliga-
tion of that parent. Other unearned income of a child may be considered 
as income to a parent depending upon the circumstances of each case. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.5, enacted by L. 
1989, ch. 214, § 7; 1990, ch. 100, § 5. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment, effective April 23, 1990, added the last 
sentence in Subsection (5)(b), in Subsection 
(7)(b) substituted "If income is imputed to a 
ANALYSIS 
Modification of award. 
Cited. 
Modification of award. 
When the parties had agreed to the amount 
of child support before the effective date of the 
child support guidelines, the trial court erred 
in modifying child support when no petition to 
modify had been filed and in modifying the 
parent, the income shall be based" for "Income 
shall be imputed to a parent based," and made 
a stylistic change in Subsection (7)(c). 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, Chapter 214 
became effective on April 24,1989, pursuant to 
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
support amount without finding that a mate-
rial change of circumstances had occurred 
since the previous order had been entered. 
Bailey v. Adams, 798 P.2d 1142 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990) (applying § 78-45-7.2(1 )(b) prior to 1990 
amendment regarding impact of guidelines on 
existing support orders). 
Cited in Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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78-45-7.15. Medical and dental expenses — Insurance. 
(1) Only the costs of health and dental insurance premiums for children are 
included in the base combined child support obligation table. 
(2) Uninsured medical and dental expenses are not included in the table. 
The child support order shall require: 
(a) the custodial parent to pay uninsured routine medical and dental 
expenses, including routine office visits, physical examinations, and im-
munizations; and 
(b) both parents to share all other reasonable and necessary uninsured 
medical and dental expenses in a ratio to be determined by the appropri-
ate court or administrative agency. 
(3) (a) If health insurance is available to both parents at a reasonable cost 
and the children would gain more complete coverage by doing so, both 
parents shall be ordered to maintain insurance for the dependent chil-
dren. 
(b) If insurance is not available to both parents at a reasonable cost or 
if no advantage to the children's coverage would result, the parent who 
can obtain the most favorable coverage shall be ordered to maintain that 
insurance. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.15, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch 214 be-
1989, ch. 214, § 17; 1990, ch. 100, § 11. came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend- Utah Const, Art. VI, Sec 25 
ment, effective April 23, 1990, in Subsection 
(2Mb), deleted "equally" after "share" and 
added the language beginning "in a ratio " 
78-45-7,16. Child care expenses — Expenses not incurred. 
(1) The monthly amount to be paid for reasonable work-related child care 
costs actually incurred on behalf of the dependent children of the parents shall 
be specified as a separate monthly amount in the order. 
(2) If an actual expense included in an amount specified in the order ceases 
to be incurred, the obligor may suspend making monthly payment of that 
expense while it is not being incurred, without obtaining a modification of the 
child support order. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch 214 be-
came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
Utah Const, Art. VI, Sec 25. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.16, enacted by L. 
1989, ch. 214, § 18; 1990, ch. 100, § 12. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment, effective Apnl 23, 1990, in Subsection 
(1) deleted "(a) The monthly amount of all 
known reasonable and necessary uninsured ex-
traordinary medical expenses and" from the 
beginning, deleted "in addition to the base 
child support award" after "to be paid," and 
substituted "a separate monthly amount" for 
"two separate monthly amounts"; redesignated 
former Subsection (1Kb) as Subsection (2), and 
deleted former Subsection (2), which read "Un-
less the expenses described in Subsection (1) 
are included in the child support order, or the 
parents enter into a written agreement to 
share the expenses, one parent may not obli-
gate both parents to pay the expenses " 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch 214 be-
came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
Utah Const, Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
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78-45-7.17. Child care costs. 
(1) The need to include child care costs in the child support order is pre-
sumed if the custodial parent is working and actually incurring the child care 
costs. 
(2) The need to include child care costs is not presumed, but may be 
awarded on a case by case basis if the costs are related to the career or 
occupational training of the custodial parent. 
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.17, enacted by L. came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
1989, ch. 214, § 19. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 214 be-
78-45-7.18. Limitation on amount of support ordered. 
(1) There is no maximum limit on the base child support award that may be 
ordered using the base combined child support obligation table or for the 
award of uninsured medical expenses except under Subsection (2). 
(2) If the combination of the two amounts under Subsection (1) exceeds 50% 
of the obligor's adjusted gross income, or by adding the child care costs, the 
total child support award would exceed 50% of the obligors adjusted gross 
income, the presumption under Section 78-45-7.17 is rebutted. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.18, enacted by L. section (1) and deleted "that" after "or" m Sub-
1989, ch. 214, § 20; 1990, ch. 100, § 13. section (2). 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend- Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch 214 be-
ment, effective April 23, 1990, deleted "ex- came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
traordmary" before "medical expenses" in Sub- Utah Const., Art VI, Sec. 25. 
78-45-7.19. Determination of parental liability. 
(1) The district court may issue an order determining the amount of a 
parent's liability for uninsured medical, hospital, and dental expenses of a 
dependent child, when the parent: 
(a) is required by a prior court or administrative order to: 
(i) share those expenses with the other parent of the dependent 
child; or 
(ii) obtain medical, hospital, or dental care insurance but fails to 
do so; or 
(b) receives direct payment from an insurer under insurance coverage 
obtained after the prior court or administrative order was issued. 
(2) If the prior court or administrative order does not specify what propor-
tions of the expenses are to be shared, the district court may determine the 
amount of liability as may be reasonable and necessary. 
(3) This section applies to an order without regard to when it was issued. 
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.19, enacted by L. came effective on April 23, 1990, pursuant to 
1990, ch. 166, § 4. Utah Const, Art. VI, Sec. 25 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1990, ch. 166 be-
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instructions. Morgan v. Quailbrook Condomin-
ium Co., 704 P.2d 573 (Utah 1985). 
Written instructions. 
—Failure to tender. 
——Waiver. 
Where plaintiff had failed to tender a writ-
ten instruction on burden of proof he could not 
claim error in the lack of such instruction. Ful-
ler v. Zinik Sporting Goods Co., 538 P.2d 1036 
(Utah 1975). 
Cited in Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 
366 P.2d 701 (1961); Hill v. Cloward, 14 Utah 
2d 55, 377 P.2d 186 (1962); Ortega v. Thomas, 
14 Utah 2d 296, 383 P.2d 406 (1963); Meier v. 
Christensen, 15 Utah 2d 182, 389 P.2d 734 
(1964); Memmott v. U.S. Fuel Co., 22 Utah 2d 
356, 453 P.2d 155 (1969); Telford v. Newell J. 
Olsen & Sons Constr. Co., 25 Utah 2d 270, 480 
P.2d 462 (1971); Flynn v. W.P. Harlin Constr. 
Co., 29 Utah 2d 327, 509 P.2d 356 (1973); 
McGinn v. Utah Power & Light Co., 529 P.2d 
423 (Utah 1974); Henderson v. Meyer, 533 P.2d 
290 (Utah 1975); Lamkin v. Lynch, 600 P.2d 
530 (Utah 1979); State v. Hall, 671 P.2d 201 
(Utah 1983); Highland Constr. Co. v. Union 
Pac. R.R., 683 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984); Gill v. 
Timm, 720 P.2d 1352 (Utah 1986); Penrod v. 
Carter, 737 P.2d 199 (Utah 1987); King v. 
Fereday, 739 P.2d 618 (Utah 1987); State v 
Cox, 751 P.2d 1152 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); 
Ramon ex rel. Ramon v. Farr, 770 P.2d 131 
(Utah 1989); Anton v. Thomas, 806 P.2d 744 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991); Reeves v. Gentile, 813 
P.2d 111 (Utah 1991); Hodges v. Gibson Prods. 
Co., 811 P.2d 151 (Utah 1991); Home Sav. & 
Loan v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 166 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 26 (Ct. App. 1991). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 75A Am. Jur. 2d Trial 
§ 1077 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 88 C.J.S. Trial §§ 266 to 448. 
A.L.R. — Propriety and prejudicial effect of 
instructions in civil case as affected by the 
manner in which they are written, 10 A.L.R.3d 
501. 
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury 
action, to prove future pain and suffering and 
to warrant instructions to jury thereon, 18 
A.L.R.3d 10. 
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury 
action, to prove impairment of earning capac-
ity and to warrant instructions to jury thereon, 
18 A.L.R.3d 88. 
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury 
action, to prove permanence of injuries and to 
warrant instructions to jury thereon, 18 
A.L.R.3d 170. 
Propriety and effect, in eminent domain pro-
ceeding, of instruction to the jury as to land-
owner's unwillingness to sell property, 20 
A.L.R.3d 1081. 
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case 
stressing desirability and importance of agree-
ment, 38 A.L.R.3d 1281. 
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case 
commenting on weight of majority view or au-
thorizing compromise, 41 A.L.R.3d 845. 
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case ad-
monishing jurors to refrain from intransigence 
or reflecting on integrity or intelligence of ju-
rors, 41 A.L.R.3d 1154. 
Construction of statutes or rules making 
mandatory the use of pattern or uniform ap-
proved jury instructions, 49 A.L.R.3d 128. 
Necessity and propriety of instructing on al-
ternative theories of negligence or breach of 
warranty, where instruction on strict liability 
in tort is given in products liability case, 52 
A.L.R.3d 101. 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, construc-
tion and effect of provision in Rule 51, and sim-
ilar state rules, that counsel be given opportu-
nity to make objections to instructions out of 
hearing of jury, 1 A.L.R. Fed. 310. 
Key Numbers. — Trial «=> 182 to 296. 
Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an 
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately it* 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall simi-
larly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the 
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of 
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given 
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses 
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be 
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considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court follow-
ing the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of 
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 4Kb). The 
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its 
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 
when the motion is based on more than one ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after 
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional find-
ings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with 
a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made 
in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not 
the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to 
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judg-
ment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions 
for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the 
parties to an issue of fact: 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 52, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Masters, Rule 53. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Adoption. 
—Abandonment of contract. 
—Advisory verdict. 
—Breach of contract. 
—Child custody. 
—Contempt. 
—Credibility of witnesses. 
—Denial of motion. 
—Divorce decree modifications. 
—Easement. 
—Evidentiary disputes. 
—Juvenile action. 
—Material issues. 
Harmless error. 
—Submission by prevailing party. 
Court's discretion. 
—Water dispute. 
Findings of state engineer. 
Amendment. 
—Motion. 
Conformance with original findings. 
New trial. 
Notice of appeal. 
Time. 
Tolling of appeal period. 
When made. 
—Overruling or vacation. 
Another district judge. 
Lack of notice. 
Child custody awards. 
Criminal cases. 
Criminal contempt. 
Effect. 
—Preclusion of summary judgment. 
—Relation to pleadings. 
Failure to object to findings. 
How findings entered. 
Judicial review. 
—Equity cases. 
—Standard of review. 
Conclusions of law. 
Criminal cases. 
Criminal trials. 
Findings of facts by jury. 
Intent. 
Juvenile proceedings. 
Purpose of rule. 
Stipulations. 
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The requirement that an olographic will 
be written by the hand of the testator is 
spelled out in Article 1588 of the Louisiana 
Civil Code which reads as follows: 
The olographic testament is that which is 
written by the testator himself. 
In order to be valid, it must be entirely 
written, dated and signed by the hand of 
the testator. It is subject to no other 
form, and may be made anywhere, even 
out of the State. 
Article 2903 of the Louisiana Code of Civil 
Procedure places the burden of proving that 
an olographic testament was "entirely writ-
ten, dated and signed by the hand of the 
testator" on the proponent of the purported 
will Article 2903 states: 
At the contradictory trial to probate a 
testament, its proponent bears the burden 
of proving the authenticity of the testa-
ment, and its oompliance with all of the 
formal requirements of law. 
[2] The requisites of meeting this bur-
den are spelled out in Article 2883 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure which states: 
The olographic testament must be proved 
by the testimony of two credible witness-
es that the testament was entirely writ-
ten, dated, and signed in the testator's 
handwriting. The court must satisfy it-
self, through interrogation or from the 
depositions of the witnesses, that the 
handwriting and signature are those of 
the testator, and must mention these 
facts in its proces verbal. 
In the present case, therefore, the burden 
of proving that the purported will was en-
tirely written by the hand of the testator 
rested with Louise King Posey. In order to 
prove this, she would have needed to have 
produced two witnesses to testify as to the 
genuineness of the writing and the signa-
ture in the document purported to be the 
will of Harold Rudolph Posey. However, 
Ms. Posey herself was the only witness to 
testify that the printing and the signature 
in the purported will was that of the dece-
dent. Thus, since proponent failed to meet 
the requirement of producing two witnesses 
found in Article 2883, she did not carry her 
burden of proving the validity of the pur-
ported will. See Succession of Sullivan, 178 
La. 230,151 So. 190 (1933) and Succession of 
Lewis 174 La. 901, 142 So. 121 (1932). 
For the reasons assigned, the judgment 
of the District Court is affirmed. All costs 
of this appeal are to be borne by appellant. 
AFFIRMED. 
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Carole Calvert CREECH, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
Bob Newton CREECH, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
No. 6792. 
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, 
Third Circuit. 
Feb. 5, 1979. 
Divorced father proceeded by rule for 
extended visitation rights, and divorced 
mother reconvened for additional child sup-
port. The 7th Judicial District Court, Par-
ish of Concordia, Richard P. Boyd, Jr., J., 
extended visitation privileges and increased 
child support, and divorced mother appeal-
ed. The Court of Appeal, Domengeaux, J., 
held that: (1) increase of child support obli-
gation from $300 per month to $325 per 
month did not constitute abuse of discre-
tion, where divorced father's annual salary 
was $28,000, with housing provided by em-
ployer, divorced mother, who was unem-
ployed at time of original child support 
decree, had take-home pay of approximate-
ly $350 per month, and father had certain 
obligations which he did not have when 
support was initially awarded, and (2) 
where divorced father, under original visi-
tation decree, had visitation rights of one 
weekend per month, the last week in De-
cember, and two weeks in the summer, but, 
because of expense and difficulty involved 
in traveling to United States from Mexico 
CREECH y 
Cite as, I^App. 
where he worked, divorced father was vir-
tually unable to visit his children one week-
end each month, increase in divorced fa-
ther^ summer visitation period from two 
weeks to five weeks was not abuse of dis-
cretion and did not amount to split or divid-
ed custody. 
Affirmed. 
1. Divorce <*=> 309.4 
Increase of child support obligation 
from $300 per month to $325 per month did 
not constitute abuse of discretion, where 
divorced father's annual salary was $28,000, 
with housing provided by employer, divorc-
ed mother, who was unemployed at time of 
original child support decree, had take-
home pay of approximately $350 per month, 
and father had certain obligations which he 
did not have when support was initially 
awarded. 
2. Infants «=> 19.3(4) 
Minors: Test of whether award of visi-
tation rights is excessive is whether the 
frequency or length of visitation will be 
detrimental to the welfare of the child. 
3. Divorce *=> 303(4) 
Where divorced father, under original 
visitation decree, had visitation rights of 
one weekend per month, the last week in 
December, and two weeks in the summer, 
but, because of expense and difficulty in-
volved in traveling to United States from 
Mexico where he worked, divorced father 
was virtually unable to visit his children 
one weekend each month, increase in di-
vorced father's summer visitation period 
from two weeks to five weeks was not 
abuse of discretion and did not amount to 
split or divided custody. 
Patrick McDonough, III, Vidalia, for 
plaintiff-appellant. 
Philip Letard, Vidalia, for defendant-ap-
pellee. 
Before DOMENGEAUX, FORET and 
STOKER, JJ. 
. CREECH La. 1245 
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DOMENGEAUX, Judge. 
Carole Calvert Creech was granted a le-
gal separation and, ultimately, a divorce 
from Bob Newton Creech. She received the 
permanent custody of the couple's two mi-
nor children, and Mr. Creech was allowed 
specific visitation privileges. Additionally, 
the mother was awarded $300.00 per month 
for child support. 
Subsequently, Mr. Creech proceeded by 
rule for extended visitation rights, and Mrs. 
Creech reconvened for additional child sup-
port. 
At hearing, the father's visitation privi-
leges were extended and child support was 
increased. Mrs. Creech now appeals con-
tending that the increase in child support 
was inadequate and that the modified visi-
tation privileges, if allowed to stand, would 
perpetuate "split or divided" custody. 
CHILD SUPPORT 
[1] The child support was increased 
from $300.00 to $325.00 per month, and, 
additionally, Mr. Creech was ordered to 
maintain dental and medical insurance for 
the children. Although the father's annual 
salary was found to be $28,000.00, with 
housing provided by his employer, we can-
not say that the trial judge abused his 
discretion in view of the limited factual 
information before us. We also note that, 
at the time of the original child support 
decree, the mother was unemployed. She is 
now employed, having take home pay of 
approximately $350.00 per month. The ob-
ligation to support, maintain, and educate 
the children extends to the mother. La.C.C. 
Art. 227. 
Additionally, the district judge noted that 
Mr. Creech now has certain obligations 
which he did not have when support was 
initially awarded. Appellant does not con-
tend that the written narrative entitled 
"Statement of Facts" has inaccurately por-
trayed that fact.1 Without the benefit of a 
transcript of the parties' testimony, we 
1. The statement of facts was prepared and signed by the trial judge at appellant's request, 
pursuant to La.C.C.P. Art. 2131. 
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must accept this finding made by the trial 
court. McDonald v. McDonald, 357 So.2d 
1293 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1978). The $25.00 
per month increase was an attempt by the 
trial court to, as he said: "balance present 
needs against present ability to pay." On 
the basis of the record before us, we find 
the increase in the support award within 
the bounds of the trial judge's discretion. 
VISITATION PRIVILEGES 
[2] In the recent case of McDonald v. 
McDonald, supra, we held that an award of 
visitation rights totaling 81 days annually 
was not excessive. The true test is whether 
the frequency or length of visitation will be 
detrimental to the welfare of the child. 
Mr. Creech is now working in Vera Cruz, 
Mexico. Because of the expense and diffi-
culty involved in traveling to the States, he 
was virtually unable to visit his children 
one weekend each month, as was originally 
provided for in the judgment of divorce. 
The trial judge concluded: "Therefore, the 
Court felt that the best interest of the 
children would be served and fairness would 
prevail upon the part of all parties if a 
summer visitation period was increased 
from two weeks to five weeks . . ." 
By enabling meaningful visitation with 
their father, this arrangement could be 
more beneficial to the children. 
[3] Under the original visitation decree, 
the defendant had visitation rights of one 
weekend per month, the last week in De-
cember, and two weeks in the summer. 
The essence of the judge's present ruling 
was to grant three additional weeks of sum-
mer visitation in lieu of weekend visitation. 
As stated above, in the McDonald case, we 
let stand a visitation grant giving the fa-
ther four weeks during the summer, five 
days at Christmas, and weekend visitation, 
which resulted in a total of 81 days. Under 
the circumstances presented in this case, 
the visitation award gives Mr. Creech ap-
proximately six weeks (45 days) with his 
children and does not amount to "split or 
divided" custody. Further, there has been 
no showing that the period allowed is of 
such duration as to cause confusion among 
the children as to parental authority. Poole 
v. Poole, 270 So.2d 215 (La.App. 1st Cir. 
1972). 
Mrs. Creech indicated concern over the 
possibility that Mr. Creech might not return 
the children once they were removed from 
the United States. Recognizing this poten-
tial problem, the district court mandated 
that Mr. Creech post a $5,000.00 bond be-
fore taking the children to Mexico. We 
appreciate the worries of the appellant, 
however, under the original visitation 
grant, Mr. Creech had the children for the 
last week of December and two weeks in 
the summer. This time would have been 
sufficient to remove the children to Mexico 
if appellee had intended to do so. Under 
the present decree, appellant is given more 
protection with the posting of a bond, which 
would be forfeited if the children are not 
returned timely. 
There has been no showing of error or 
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial 
judge. 
For the above reasons, the judgment is 
affirmed at appellant's costs. 
AFFIRMED. 
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Robert PELOQUIN, Indiv., etc., 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
CALCASIEU PARISH POLICE JURY et 
al., Defendants-Appellees. 
No. 6793. 
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, 
Third Circuit. 
Feb. 5, 1979. 
Plaintiffs sued defendants for damages 
for conversion of their pet cat, for value of 
cat, and for mental anguish, inconvenience, 
and humiliation suffered due to defendants 
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statute if its meaning is clear from the 
language employed. Id. In the same 
light, we will look to the object to be ac-
complished and the evils and mischiefs 
sought to be remedied in reaching a reason-
able or liberal construction which will best 
effect its purpose rather than one which 
will defeat it. Shidler v. All American 
Life & Financial, 298 N.W.2d 318, 321 
(Iowa 1980). 
[2] The appellee/mother urges the lan-
guage of section 600A.3 clearly leads to a 
conclusion it is the exclusive remedy in 
termination cases. There is no reported 
decision on point, however, a 1987 Iowa 
Supreme Court decision aids us in our 
analysis. In its decision addressing the 
admissibility of hearsay evidence in termi-
nation proceedings, the court began its 
analysis by following the provisions of 
chapter 600A until it reached section 
600A.5. Here the court noted the statutes 
bisected forming separate procedural paths 
for the resolution of disputed termination 
proceedings. In Interest of E.J.R., 400 
N.W.2d 531, 533 (Iowa 1987). Important 
here is the court acknowledged section 
600A.3 (which provides termination ''shall 
be accomplished only according to the pro-
visions of this chapter") as its storting 
point, indicating its belief that 600A.3 is 
where the legislature has given exclusive 
authority to terminate parental rights. 
E.J.R., 400 N.W.2d at 531. We agree with 
this analysis. 
Chapter 600A was adopted prior to 1966 
when the juvenile justice act was enacted 
(now chapter 232) and the legislature has 
never acted to amend or repeal section 
600A.3. The legislature therefore intended 
to provide in chapter 232 a second proce-
dure for instituting termination proceed-
ings, but not for the actual termination 
itself. Thus, we determine section 600A.9 
is applicable to all termination proceedings. 
Finally, we note the golden thread run-
ning through both chapter 600A and chap-
ter 232 is the best interests of the child. 
We do not believe the liberal intent of the 
legislature to assure the best interests of 
the child can be accomplished by a con-
struction which would tie the hands of ju-
venile courts in these matters. These pro-
visions should be construed broadly to en-
sure the court has the ability to achieve its 
statutorily mandated goal of protecting and 
providing for the best interests of the chil-
dren involved. To decide this case differ-
ently, would work against the legislature's 
stated intent. 
AFFIRMED. 
In re MARRIAGE OF Susan 
HATZIEVGENAKIS and 
Vassilis Hatzievgenakis, 
Upon the Petition of Susan Hatzievge-
nakis, Petitioner-Appellee, 
And Concerning Vassilis Hatzievgenakis, 
Respondent-Appellant. 
No. 88-388. 
Court of Appeals of Iowa. 
Nov. 29, 1988. 
The District Court, Marion County, 
James Brown and Jerrold Jordan, JJ., en-
tered decree dissolving marriage, and hus-
band appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Sackett, J., held that: (1) refusal to grant 
continuance to husband whose employment 
as cruise ship captain required him to be 
out of the country at time of dissolution 
trial was not abuse of discretion; (2) re-
strictions placed on out-of-country visita-
tion between son and husband, who was 
Greek citizen, were unreasonable; (3) prop-
erty division would be modified; and (4) 
child support would be reduced from $500 
to $400 per month. 
Affirmed as modified. 
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1. Appeal and Error <s=»966(l) 
Pretrial Procedure <s=»713 
Granting of motion to continue trial is 
at discretion of trial court and will be over-
turned on appeal only where there is clear 
abuse of discretion. 
2. Appeal and Error <s=>1043(7) 
Prejudice must be shown to require 
reversal of judgment for denial of motion 
to continue trial. 
3. Divorce @=»145 
Refusal to grant continuance to cruise 
ship captain who was scheduled to be on 
duty on date of dissolution trial was not 
abuse of discretion, even though captain 
had not requested any previous continuanc-
es and had filed pleadings and other court 
papers in timely manner, where captain did 
not request continuance until 11 days be-
fore trial, despite receiving notice of date 
four months previously. 
4. Divorce <©=»301 
Unreasonable restrictions on out-of-
country visitation by Greek citizen with his 
son were not justified where mother's fears 
that her son would not be returned from 
Greece were not supported by any evi-
dence. 
5. Divorce <s*300 
Restriction imposed on out-of-country 
visitation by Greek father with his son, 
that father have at least two visitations 
with son prior to any trip to Greece, was 
unreasonable where father's work schedule 
as captain of cruise vessel, geography and 
expense made required visits impossible. 
6. Divorce <£=>261 
Provisions making out-of-country visi-
tation by Greek father with son contingent 
on payment of child support and property 
settlement were not in accord with state 
law and would be stricken. 
7. Divorce e=>252.3(l), 252.4 
Appropriate property division for par-
ties who had net worth of approximately 
$12,000 plus household goods and vehicles 
was to award wife all household goods and 
furnishings in her possession, vehicle, and 
her checking and savings accounts, and to 
award husband lot in foreign country, his 
vehicle and foreign bank accounts and to 
require him to pay $3,000 to wife in addi-
tion to satisfying $2,120 worth of her credit 
card debt. 
8. Divorce <s=>308 
Award of $500 per month for support 
of one child would be modified to $400 per 
month where father grossed $2,293 month-
ly and netted $1,985. 
Steven W. Guiter, of Johnston, Hicks & 
Guiter, Knoxville, for respondent-appellant. 
Garold F. Heslinga, of Heslinga, Heslin-
ga, Dixon & Grotewold, Oskaloosa, for peti-
tioner-appellee. 
Considered by OXBERGER, C.J., and 
DONIELSON and SACKETT, JJ. 
SACKETT, Judge. 
Respondent-appellant Vassilis Hatzievge-
nakis appeals the decree dissolving his mar-
riage to petitioner-appellee Susan Hatzi-
evgenakis. He contends the trial court (1) 
should have granted his motion for continu-
ance, (2) should not have placed unreason-
able restrictions on allowing him to take his 
son outside the United States for visitation, 
and (3) made an inequitable property and 
child support award. We affirm as mod-
ified. 
The parties were married in 1980. Su-
san, a resident of Marion County, Iowa, is a 
travel agent. Vassilis, a Greek national, is 
a ship captain. They have a child who was 
born in Iowa in 1982. The child is a United 
States and Greek citizen. Susan maintains 
a residence in Marion County; Vassilis 
maintains a residence in Greece. 
On April 27, 1987, Susan filed in Marion 
County for a dissolution of their marriage. 
Vassilis was personally served in New Or-
leans on May 21,1987, and on June 9,1987, 
Vassilis answered the petition and in doing 
so submitted to the jurisdiction of the Iowa 
court on all issues. He requested joint 
custody of the child. On October 7, 1987, 
Vassilis filed a financial statement and on 
November 7, 1987, Susan filed a financial 
statement. Interrogatories were pro-
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pounded to Vassilis which were answered 
October 7, 1987. 
Neither party filed a trial certificate. 
See Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 181. 
However, on August 21, 1987, the court on 
its own motion in an attempt to comply 
with case disposition time standards estab-
lished by the Iowa Supreme Court, ordered 
<a scheduling conference. An order was 
issued September 11, 1987 closing dis-
covery on December 10, 1987; closing 
pleadings on December 17, 1987 and set-
ting the trial for January 28, 1988. A copy 
of the order was mailed to Vassilis' attor-
ney on September 14, 1987. On January 
11, 1988, Vassilis filed a motion to continue 
claiming his tour of duty as a Staff Captain 
for a Greek cruise ship sailing in the Cape 
Horn area of South America made it impos-
sible to attend the January trial. He asked 
for a continuance until late June or July 
1988. Susan resisted. The trial court 
overruled the motion. 
I. 
[1-3] Vassilis contends the trial court 
erred in not granting a continuance. The 
granting or denial of a motion for continu-
ance is in the discretion of the trial court 
and will be interfered with on appeal only 
where there is a clear abuse of discretion. 
Department of Gen, Servs., State of Iowa 
v. R.M. Boggs Co., Inc., 336 N.W.2d 408, 
410 (Iowa 1983); Estate of Lovell, 344 
N.W.2d 576, 578 (Iowa App.1983). Preju-
dice must be shown to require a reversal 
for denial for such a motion. Cavanagh v. 
O'Connor, 194 Iowa 670, 186 N.W. 907 
(1922). It must be shown an injustice has 
been done. In re Tomin's Estate, 260 
Iowa 1129, 152 N.W.2d 286 (1967). Ordi-
narily an abuse is found to exist only 
where there is not support in the record for 
the trial court's action. Rath v. Sholty, 
199 N.W.2d 333, 336 (Iowa 1972). 
Vassilis signs on a ship for an extended 
period of time. His employment may be 
jeopardized if he leaves the ship during his 
tour of service. This was the first time the 
case was set for trial. Vassilis has not 
requested any other continuances and ap-
pears to have filed pleadings and financial 
information in a timely manner. He did 
not request a continuance until eleven days 
before trial despite the fact the case had 
been set since September 1987. 
Vassilis has failed to show the trial court 
abused its discretion in not granting him a 
continuance. 
II. 
[4] Vassilis contends the trial court un-
duly restricted his out of country visitation. 
The decree provided Vassilis have reason-
able visitation with the child in the conti-
nental United States and he have the right 
commencing in the summer of 1989 to take 
the child to Greece or outside the United 
States, but before he could exercise out-of-
country visitation with his son he be re-
quired to first meet the following condi-
tions: 
(1) That he have at least two significant 
visitations with the child within the six 
months prior to the visit; 
(2) He 'post a bond with the Marion 
County Clerk of Court in the amount 
of $20,000 cash or surety; 
(3) All child support payments then be 
current; , 
(4) His property settlement payments or-
dered previously be paid by the Re-
spondent. 
(5) He pay the travel expenses. 
Vassilis contends the first four restric-
tions should be removed or modified. Vas-
silis was named a joint custodian. He has 
met the joint custody test. See In re Mar-
riage of Ley da, 355 N.W.2d 862, 864 (Iowa 
1984). The trial court has determined the 
child can go to Greece. Susan has not 
cross-appealed on either issue. 
The only thing we must determine is 
whether the trial court imposed too many 
restrictions. There is no evidence Vassilis 
has ever threatened or indicated he would 
keep the child in Greece. Susan's request 
for the restrictions was based on the fol-
lowing evidence. She was concerned about 
the child going to Greece because she lived 
in Greece. She feels there is no separation 
of church and state in Greece. Greece is a 
male oriented society and in a dissolution 
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the father gets custody. Susan read an 
article and saw a television show that con-
vinced her she would have problems re-
turning the child from Greece. The child 
does not speak Greek. 
We recognize there are sometimes prob-
lems securing the return from a foreign 
country of a child to a custodial parent in 
the United States, particularly where the 
noncustodial parent is a citizen of the other 
country and once out of the United States 
the child no longer has the rights and liber-
ties of the United States Constitution. 
The Iowa court recently was confronted 
with the problem of a father who while his 
marriage dissolution was pending in Iowa 
sent his child to his home country of Jor-
dan. He remained in Iowa. Nearly two 
years later the child had not been returned 
to Iowa despite numerous orders directing 
the father to return the child to Iowa. See 
Amro v. Iowa Dist Ct for Story County, 
429 N.W.2d 135 (Iowa 1988). 
We find after reviewing Vassilis' finan-
cial statement the restrictions imposed m\\ 
effectively preclude Vassilis from having 
his child visit with him in Greece. We have 
long subscribed to a philosophy children of 
broken homes should have substantial con-
tacts with both parents. See In re Mar-
riage of Jerome, 378 N.W.2d 302, 305 
(Iowa App.1985). The world does not end 
at the borders of Iowa. These parties lived 
with the child in both Greece and the Unit-
ed States. Susan is a travel agent. Vassil-
is is a Greek ship captain. Both are sophis-
ticated and knowledgeable about interna-
tional travel. They come from diverse cul-
tures and backgrounds. The child is a citi-
zen of two countries and has a right to be 
introduced and exposed to both. The child 
has a grandmother, an aunt and uncle and 
cousins he will not know unless he travels 
to Greece. 
We examine provisions for authorizing 
out of the country visitation by noncustodi-
al parents in other jurisdictions. In Cali-
fornia the court allowed visitation in South 
Africa, determining the children would ben-
efit from visiting with this father in his 
home community and the children would be 
well cared for by the father. See Milne v. 
Goldstein, 202 Cal.App.2d 582, 20 Cal.Rptr. 
903 (1962). In Louisiana the court allowed 
the father to exercise visitation in Mexico 
finding it would be impossible for the chil-
dren to spend time with him unless they 
went to Mexico where he worked. See 
Creech v. Creech, 367 So.2d 1244 (La.Ct. 
App.1979). In Oregon the court did not 
prohibit visitation where the mother had a 
fear but no facts indicating the children 
would not be returned. See In re Mar-
riage of Ross, 45 Or.App. 565, 608 P.2d 
1214 (1980). 
There is nothing in this record and Susan 
has presented no evidence other than her 
fears to support her position. Vassilis has 
appeared and consented to the jurisdiction 
of the Iowa courts on all issues. There is 
no evidence he has thwarted Susan's custo-
dy in any way. He has the right to assume 
we will offer him the same justice we offer 
Susan. While she expresses fears the child 
will not be allowed to leave Greece, she 
asks our courts to prevent the child from 
leaving the United States. 
Our hope for justice for our citizens in 
foreign courts can best be forwarded by 
our efforts to offer fair and equitable treat-
ment to foreign nationals in our jurisdic-
tion. We cannot assume Vassilis will not 
honor our decree. 
[5] We examine the restrictions im-
posed by the trial court. Vassilis contends 
the requirement for him to have two visita-
tions prior to the trip should be removed. 
He contends his work schedule, geography 
and expense makes the required visits im-
possible. While ideally we would like to 
see this child have frequent contacts with 
his father before spending a month with 
him, we find as Vassilis argues geography, 
work schedule and expense makes such a 
requirement prohibitive. We agree with 
Vassilis and strike that provision. 
[6] Vassilis next contends the provi-
sions making the visitation contingent on 
payment of child support and the property 
settlement are not in accord with the dic-
tates of Iowa case law. We agree. The 
Iowa court has said the opportunity for 
association with one's noncustodial parent 
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should not be denied because there has not 
been compliance with the support-money 
provisions of a decree. See Sweat v. 
Sweat, 238 Iowa 999, 1009-10, 29 N.W.2d 
180, 185 (1947) (the court modified a decree 
to strike provisions making visitation con-
tingent on the payment of child support) 
and Fitch v. Fitch, 207 Iowa 1193, 1196, 
224 N.W. 503 (1929) (where the court mod-
ified the decree to strike a provision visita-
tion was contingent on the payment of ali-
mony). 
Following the dictates of Sweat and 
Fitch we strike from the visitation require-
ment the provision that all property settle-
ment and alimony be paid before out-of-
country visitation is authorized. In doing 
so, however, we find it incumbent to re-
mind Vassilis that courts of this state ex-
pects him to comply with the terms of the 
decree. We consider his obligation to sup-
port his child to be a most serious one and 
his failure to pay could subject him, among 
other things, to the contempt power of the 
Iowa courts. 
Vassilis contends the bond requirement 
should be reduced. He offered to post a 
bond and does not disagree with a bond 
requirement; rather he contends his finan-
cial condition prevents him from posting a 
$20,000 bond. We find the bond should be 
reduced to $10,000. 
III. 
[7] Vassilis contends the property divi-
sion is not equitable. The trial court or-
dered Vassilis to pay Susan $11,500 as a 
property settlement, $1,500 toward her 
credit card indebtedness and $600 toward 
attorney fees. He contends the award is 
not equitable. Vassilis claims the parties 
have assets of $10,000. Susan contends 
they have net assets of about $100,000, 
including a condominium in Greece she 
claims has a value of $85,000 and is not 
encumbered. Vassilis denies owning the 
condominium. The only evidence of condo-
minium ownership is Susan's testimony 
that Vassilis told her once they owned the 
condominium and another time they did 
not. Susan also contends $8,300 was trans-
ferred to Greece in 1983 for the condomin-
ium. Vassilis agrees the $8,300 was trans-
ferred to an account in Greece. However, 
he contends and bank records filed in re-
sponse to a request for production show 
$11,200 was transferred from Greece to the 
Interstate Bank of Urbandale in September 
1986. Susan makes no explanation for this 
transfer. 
We determine the parties have a com-
bined net worth of approximately $12,000, 
less household goods and furnishings 
which Susan has in her possession. Susan 
also apparently has a 1982 Oldsmobile, 
jointly owned,, which she values at $4,000. 
The trial court made no disposition of the 
parties' assets, other than to provide for 
Vassilis' payment of $11,500 as a property 
settlement and a $1,200 payment toward 
debt. 
We modify the property award made by 
the trial court to strike the provision for 
Vassilis to pay a $11,500 property settle-
ment and $1,200 toward debt. We award 
Susan all household goods and furnishings 
in her possession and the 1982 Oldsmobile, 
as well as her checking and savings ac-
count in Iowa. The lot in Greece, Japanese 
car and Greek bank accounts shall go to 
Vassilis except he shall pay Susan $3,000. 
He shall also pay the Visa, Discover and 
Master Card debts of $2,120. Susan shall 
be responsible for the Younkers and Sei-
ferts bills of $1,146. We find such an 
award to be equitable. See In re Marriage 
ofByall, 353 N.W.2d 103, 106 (Iowa App. 
1984). 
IV. 
[8] Vassilis contends $500 a month child 
support is inequitable. We agree. Vassilis 
grossed $2,293.93 monthly and netted 
$1,985.25. We modify to $400 per month. 
Each party shall pay his or her own 
attorney fees on appeal. Court costs are 
taxed one-half to each party. 
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED. 
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